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Abstract	
This	thesis	examines	the	extent	to	which	state	institutions	and	government	have	taken	into	account	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	approval	process	for	a	large	mining	development.	This	case	study	focuses	on	the	various	phases	of	approval	for	the	proposed	Adani	Carmichael	Coal	Mine,	a	significant	development	that	has	challenged	the	native	title	system	in	Australia.	It	assesses	the	extent	to	which	the	rights	and	interests	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people,	the	traditional	owners	that	possess	a	native	title	claim	over	the	region,	have	been	upheld	by	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	and	the	State	and	Federal	Government.	This	thesis	employs	multiple	theoretical	perspectives	to	explain	the	outcomes	of	the	approval	process.	While	this	study	aims	to	critically	review	the	existing	literature,	the	application	of	two	liberal	culturalist	perspectives	and	the	broader	framework	of	critical	race	theory	contribute	added	insights	in	the	area	of	native	title	and	resource	developments.		
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 1 
Introduction	
Mining	Companies,	the	State	and	Indigenous	Groups	
This	study	will	examine	the	extent	to	which	state	institutions	and	government	have	taken	into	account	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	approval	process	for	large	mining	developments.	It	will	focus	on	the	various	phases	of	approval	for	the	Adani	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	and	assess	the	extent	to	which	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	have	been	upheld.	The	Adani	Carmichael	Project	is	a	significant	development	proposal	that	has	greatly	challenged	and	exposed	limitations	within	Australia’s	native	title	system	(Borschmann,	2015;	Milman,	2015a,	2015b;	Palese,	2015).		The	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	development	is	located	in	the	Galilee	Basin	in	central	Queensland.	It	will	be	the	second	largest	coal	mine	in	the	world	with	a	proposed	scale	that	includes	six	open-cut	pits	and	a	lifetime	of	up	to	60	years	(Horn,	2016).	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	possess	a	registered	native	title	claim	over	the	proposed	mine	site	and	while	some	community	members	have	sought	to	negotiate	a	land	use	agreement	with	Adani,	others	have	remained	relentlessly	opposed	to	the	project	(Milman,	2015a;	Taylor,	2015;	Robertson,	2015;	West,	2015).		This	thesis	examines	the	responses	of	state	institutions	and	government	to	Indigenous	rights	and	interests.	The	terms	‘state’	and	‘government’	refer	to	separate	mechanisms	of	the	modern	society.	The	term	‘state’	refers	to	the	set	of	institutions	that	enforce	the	rules	of	a	society,	such	as	the	administrative	bureaucracy,	the	judicial	system	and	the	military	(Best,	2002;	McAuley,	2003).	State	institutions	are	independent	of	government,	however,	the	state	is	tasked	with	interpreting	and	implementing	the	decisions	of	past	and	present	political	leadership.	The	term	‘government’	refers	to	the	elected	representatives	of	parliament.	While	the	government	can	change	with	every	election,	institutions	of	the	state	remain	constant	(Best,	2002).	This	study	will	examine	the	responses	of	state	judicial	bodies	such	as	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT),	the	elected	government	of	the	State	of	Queensland	and	the	Federal	Government.			
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Australia	is	a	resource-driven	nation	and	resource	companies	exercise	a	high	degree	of	power	in	the	political	sphere.	The	carbon	lobby	has	influenced	government	decision-making	and	public	opinion	(Baer,	2014;	Esteban	&	Ray,	2006;	Hodder,	2009;	McKnight	&	Hobbs,	2013).	It	is	widely	known	that	resource	companies	make	significant	contributions	to	political	parties.	The	heads	of	multinational	corporations	often	enjoy	a	close	relationship	with	members	of	the	public	office	and	influence	policy	that	relates	to	resource	interests	(Baer,	2014;	Hodder,	2009).	State	institutions	and	government	have	a	tendency	to	prioritise	demands	in	the	energy	and	mining	sector.		International	law	supports	the	rights	of	Indigenous	groups	and	encourages	nations	to	implement	domestic	laws	that	adhere	to	international	standards	(Australian	Law	Reform	Commission	[ALRC],	2015).	The	Australian	Government	faces	a	conflict	between	advancing	what	is	considered	to	be	the	national	interest	or	endorsing	international	standards	and	the	rights	and	interests	of	Indigenous	communities.	The	prevailing	national	interest	in	resource	development	may	compromise	the	interests	of	traditional	owners	(Altman,	2009;	Howlett,	2010;	Marsh,	2013;	Scambary,	2013).		The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	a	history	of	spiritual	connection	to	the	lands	surrounding	the	town	of	Clermont	in	Central	Queensland	(NNTT,	2014).	The	names	‘Wangan’	and	‘Jagalingou’	refer	to	different	Indigenous	tribal	groups	that	have	historically	inhabited	the	region.	European	settlement	on	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	land	became	sustained	in	the	1860s	and	several	families	were	forcibly	removed	to	other	areas	(NNTT,	2014).	However,	many	of	these	families	remained	living	in	the	traditional	area	and	maintained	a	strong	physical	connection	to	the	land.		Some	descendants	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	been	the	victims	of	massacres,	such	as	the	Mistake	Creek	massacre	of	1857	(NNTT,	2014).	The	group	shares	a	common	knowledge	of	spiritual	and	religious	beliefs	and	continues	many	traditional	ways	of	life,	such	as	a	landholding	system	based	on	inheritance	through	cognatic	descent.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	demonstrated	a	clear	connection	to	the	traditional	land	that	surrounds	Clermont,	and	the	factual	evidence	provided	to	the	NNTT	has	deemed	their	native	title	claim	as	valid	before	the	Federal	Court	(NNTT,	2014).		
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The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	had	a	native	title	claim	application	registered	with	the	NNTT	since	July	2004	(NNTT,	2004;	Queensland	South	Native	Title	Services	[QSNTS],	2015).	The	application	covers	30,200	square	kilometres	in	central	Queensland.	The	Federal	Court	determined	that	the	group	had	a	continuing	connection	to	the	land	that	pre-dated	European	settlement	in	the	region	(NNTT,	2014).	As	there	are	several	overlapping	native	title	claims	involving	other	Indigenous	groups,	the	final	determination	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claim	has	been	delayed.	While	the	status	of	their	claim	remains	unresolved,	the	group	still	possesses	a	number	of	procedural	rights	as	registered	claimants	(NNTT,	2014;	QSNTS,	2015).	It	is	mandated	that	the	claim	group	are	given	notification	of	future	acts	and	that	negotiations	are	conducted	to	reach	a	legally	binding	agreement	(QSNTS,	2015).	Adani	obtained	the	consent	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	in	an	Indigenous	Land	Use	Agreement	(ILUA)	signed	in	April	2016	(“Adani	mine,”	2016).	However,	the	authorisation	of	this	agreement	was	highly	contentious	and	problematic	as	a	significant	section	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	deemed	the	vote	unrepresentative	and	illegitimate	(Robertson,	2016d,	2017;	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	Family	Council	[WJ	Family	Council],	2016).	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	became	divided	in	the	course	of	negotiations,	as	some	community	members	shared	different	opinions	about	the	development	on	their	land	(Milman,	2015a;	Taylor,	2015;	Robertson,	2015,	2016a,	2017;	West,	2015).		While	one	faction	supported	the	Carmichael	Project,	provided	the	ILUA	included	satisfactory	terms	of	agreement,	the	other	was	unwilling	to	support	the	development	on	any	terms	(Van	Vonderen,	2016;	Milman,	2015a;	Robertson,	2015,	2016c,	West,	2015).	The	latter	camp	contended	that	the	project	will	lead	to	the	destruction	of	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	ancestral	lands	and	insisted	that	‘no	means	no’	regardless	of	the	compensation	offered	(Robertson,	2016b,	2016c;	WJ	Family	Council,	2016a).	Examining	the	process	of	division,	whereby	these	two	groups	within	the	community	developed	such	opposing	stances	during	the	phases	of	approval,	is	a	key	focus	of	this	thesis.					
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International	Law	and	Australia	
There	have	been	important	developments	over	the	past	20	years	towards	the	recognition	and	protection	of	Indigenous	peoples	around	the	globe	(Tauli-Corpuz,	2008).	Indigenous	issues	have	been	placed	on	the	international	human	rights	agenda	and	a	number	of	significant	treaties	have	established	the	rights	of	Indigenous	peoples.	The	United	Nations	(UN)	Permanent	Forum	on	Indigenous	Issues	was	established	in	2002	and	the	UN	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	(UNDRIP)	entered	into	force	in	2007	(Palese,	2015;	Tauli-Corpuz,	2008).	These	two	Indigenous	rights	developments	mark	significant	modern	advancements	for	Indigenous	groups	worldwide.	The	UNDRIP	has	established	an	international	framework	that	can	inform	domestic	laws	dealing	with	the	collective	rights	of	Indigenous	peoples	(ALRC,	2015;	Davis,	2007).	The	Declaration	sets	the	minimum	standards	that	every	country	should	abide	by	to	fully	recognise	and	protect	the	rights	of	Indigenous	groups.	While	the	document	is	not	legally	binding,	it	is	recommended	that	countries	implement	its	provisions	in	domestic	law	to	remain	consistent	with	international	standards	(ALRC,	2015;	Davis,	2007;	Tauli-Corpuz,	2008).		In	2007,	143	state	parties	voted	in	support	of	the	UNDRIP	and	four	voted	in	opposition.	The	state	parties	that	voted	against	the	Declaration	were	Australia,	Canada,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	States	(United	Nations,	2007).	Among	other	concerns	raised,	these	nations	were	opposed	to	language	in	the	Declaration	suggesting	Indigenous	groups	had	the	right	to	veto	national	legislation	if	it	was	likely	to	impact	their	rights	and	interests.	Australia’s	UN	delegate	contended	that	the	references	to	self-determination	would	encourage	the	secession	of	Australia’s	Indigenous	peoples	and,	in	turn,	undermine	or	completely	eradicate	the	democratic	system	of	governance	for	those	populations	(Davis,	2007;	United	Nations,	2007).	In	2009,	Australia	reversed	its	position	and	chose	to	adopt	the	Declaration	(ALRC,	2015;	Douglas,	2013;	Rodgers,	2009).	Since	the	Declaration	is	non-binding,	Australia’s	support	of	its	principles	places	no	obligation	on	the	government	to	make	changes	to	domestic	law.	However,	countries	are	encouraged	to	introduce	or	amend	laws	so	they	fulfill	the	principles	of	the	Declaration	(Macklin,	2009).			While	Australia	has	given	domestic	effect	to	a	number	of	international	treaties,	the	principles	of	the	UNDRIP	have	been	seldom	referenced	in	the	High	Court	
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(ALRC,	2015).	Many	years	before	the	UNDRIP	entered	into	force,	the	Australian	Government	passed	legislation	for	its	first	national	system	of	collective	Indigenous	land	rights	known	as	native	title.	While	the	Native	Title	Act	(NTA)	was	legislated	with	reference	to	international	law	at	the	time,	universal	human	rights	standards	prior	to	the	UNDRIP	did	not	address	collective	rights	for	Indigenous	peoples	(ALRC,	2015).	The	right	to	Free,	Prior	and	Informed	Consent	(FPIC)	set	out	in	the	UNDRIP	applies	to	Indigenous	land	rights	with	respect	to	development	(Hanna	&	Vanclay,	2013;	Tauli-Corpuz,	2008;	Rumler,	2011).	While	FPIC	is	cited	numerous	times	in	the	Declaration,	it	is	Article	32	that	addresses	development:	States	shall	consult	and	cooperate	in	good	faith	with	the	indigenous	peoples	concerned	through	their	own	representative	institutions	in	order	to	obtain	their	free	and	informed	consent	prior	[emphasis	added]	to	the	approval	of	any	project	affecting	their	lands	or	territories	and	other	resources,	particularly	in	connection	with	the	development,	utilization	or	exploitation	of	mineral,	water	or	other	resources.	(United	Nations,	2008,	p.	12)	FPIC	mandates	the	State’s	responsibility	to	withhold	development	until	the	consent	of	Indigenous	communities	is	obtained	(Hill,	Lillywhite	&	Simon,	2010).	The	term	‘consent’	refers	to	the	Indigenous	group’s	collective	decision	to	accept	or	reject	a	development.	Some	argue	that	the	notion	of	consent	implies	the	right	to	veto	development	(Rumler,	2011).	While	the	NTA	ensures	the	right	to	consultation	and	consent	for	some	native	title	holders	and	claimants,	the	choice	to	withhold	consent	does	not	veto	development	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).	If	consent	fails	to	be	obtained,	the	Australian	Government	can	extinguish	Indigenous	rights	to	land	through	compulsory	acquisition	(Australian	Human	Rights	Commission	[AHRC],	2014;	NNTT,	2008a).		In	many	cases,	native	title	has	been	overridden	when	the	State	has	deemed	a	development	to	be	in	the	public	interest.	Cariño	and	Colchester	(2010)	argue	that	the	recognition	of	FPIC	does	not	permit	states	to	disregard	consent	on	the	basis	of	national	interest.	However,	the	Minerals	Council	of	Australia	(MCA)	contends	that	“mineral	ownership	is	vested	in	the	Crown	and	accordingly	the	process	of	seeking	consent	does	not	confer	a	right	of	veto	to	Indigenous	
Kate	Arnautovic,	2017	
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people”	(MCA,	2014,	p.	1).	Thus,	the	State	has	the	overarching	right	to	grant	tenement	regardless	of	consent.		While	it	remains	unclear	whether	FPIC	implies	the	right	to	veto	development,	it	can	be	reasonably	accepted	that	Indigenous	peoples	have	the	right	to	withhold	consent	if	a	state	is	aligned	with	the	principles	of	FPIC	(Cariño	&	Colchester,	2010;	Collins,	Ali,	Lawson	&	Young,	2016;	Portalewska,	2012;	Smyth,	2016).	As	Cariño	and	Colchester	(2010)	assert,	“international	law	is	explicit	that	indigenous	and	tribal	peoples	enjoy	the	right	to	give	or	to	withhold	their	FPIC	to	activities	or	policies	which	may	affect	them”	(p.	430).	Therefore,	when	consent	is	withheld,	the	State	is	responsible	for	the	decision	to	protect	or	negate	the	rights	and	interests	of	its	Indigenous	peoples.		While	the	Australian	Government	may	wield	the	power	to	extinguish	Indigenous	land	rights	in	order	to	pave	the	way	for	development,	traditional	owners	can	still	refuse	to	sign	an	agreement	and	thereby	withhold	their	consent.	The	notion	that	consent	is	free	of	coercion	means	it	cannot	be	forced	or	mandated	under	any	procedural	conditions	(Portalewska,	2012;	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	[OHCHR],	2013).	Governments	must	therefore	make	a	decision	to	respect	the	interests	of	traditional	owners	or	grant	mining	tenement	without	consent.	The	latter	decision	may	cause	governments	to	be	criticised	as	indifferent	or	insensitive	to	Indigenous	interests	and	may	affect	the	grantee’s	social	license	to	operate	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2011;	Scambary,	2013).		The	native	title	system	in	Australia	is	largely	based	on	the	assumption	that	consent	will	be	obtained,	as	negotiations	between	the	government,	the	mining	interest	and	Indigenous	group	must	be	conducted	in	‘good	faith’	of	reaching	an	agreement.	The	scenario	where	a	native	title	holder	or	claimant	refuses	to	consent	to	any	agreement	appears	to	be	a	non-option	in	Australian	law	(Marsh,	2013).	The	AHRC	published	a	review	measuring	the	rights	afforded	to	Indigenous	peoples	in	the	NTA	against	the	principles	of	the	UNDRIP.	The	review	concluded:	While	the	Native	Title	Act	provides	a	process	to	recognise	native	title	rights	and	interests	in	the	traditional	lands,	territories	and	resources	
Kate	Arnautovic,	2017	
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for	Aboriginal	and	Torres	Strait	Islander	peoples,	a	gap	exists	between	the	realisation	of	these	rights	and	interests	and	those	rights	affirmed	in	the	Declaration.	(AHRC,	2014,	p.	9)	When	compared	with	the	principles	of	the	UNDRIP,	Indigenous	land	rights	in	Australia	fail	to	satisfy	international	standards.	The	protection	of	human	rights	in	Australia	was	assessed	in	the	2012	Universal	Periodic	Review.	The	review	criticised	Australia	for	its	slow	domestic	implementation	of	the	UNDRIP	(AHRC,	2012).	It	can	be	concluded	that	native	title,	as	the	domestic	equivalent	of	Indigenous	land	rights	and	FPIC,	does	not	satisfy	the	most	recent	requirements	of	Indigenous	rights	in	international	law.				
Australian	Domestic	Law	
Australia’s	native	title	system	enables	Indigenous	groups	to	be	granted	land	rights	through	an	application	process.	The	recognition	of	Indigenous	land	rights	overturned	the	notion	of	terra	nullius	and	aimed	to	restore	a	degree	of	self-determination	and	sovereign	ownership	to	the	nation’s	first	peoples.	Colonialists	deemed	native	land	as	terra	nullius,	a	Latin	phrase	meaning	‘nobody’s	land’	(Poynton,	1994;	Short,	2007).	The	High	Court’s	controversial	
Mabo	decision	in	1992	abolished	the	myth	of	terra	nullius	and	the	existence	of	Indigenous	customary	land	was	nationally	recognised	(Finn,	2012;	Moreton-Robinson,	1998;	Poynton,	1994;	Short,	2007).		The	Mabo	case	began	with	a	Torres	Strait	Islander	man	who	challenged	the	laws	governing	land	ownership.	During	the	1980s,	Eddie	Koliko	Mabo	took	the	State	of	Queensland	to	court	in	an	attempt	to	claim	traditional	ownership	of	Murray	Island	(Hill,	1995).	When	the	High	Court	ruled	in	favour	of	Mabo,	the	former	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating	introduced	legislation	to	establish	a	national	system	for	Indigenous	land	rights	(Poynton,	1994).	The	Native	Title	
Act	1993	was	the	first	piece	of	legislation	that	aimed	to	rectify	the	dispossession	of	Indigenous	land.	In	the	years	that	followed	its	enactment,	subsequent	amendments	to	the	NTA	diminished	the	rights	attributed	to	native	title	groups	(Behrendt	&	Strelein,	2001;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Ritter,	2009).			In	1996,	the	High	Court	made	a	second	landmark	decision	for	Indigenous	land	rights.	The	Wik	decision	ruled	that	pastoral	leases	did	not	necessarily	
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extinguish	native	title	(Short,	2007;	Strelein,	2009).	The	Wik	people,	a	collective	of	different	Indigenous	groups,	took	the	State	of	Queensland	to	court	in	order	to	have	their	native	title	claim	recognised	despite	two	overlapping	pastoral	leases.	The	determination	handed	down	in	favour	of	the	Wik	people	created	uncertainty	for	pastoralists	across	the	nation,	as	pastoral	leases	comprised	42	per	cent	of	Crown	land	(Stevenson,	1997;	Strelein,	2009).	In	response,	the	Howard	Government	legislated	the	Native	Title	Amendment	Act	
1998.	The	amendments	to	the	NTA	diminished	the	rights	of	Indigenous	claimants,	ruling	out	the	coexistence	of	native	title	and	pastoral	leases	and	increasing	the	requirements	to	prove	connection	(Finn,	2012;	Smith	&	Morphy,	2007;	Strelein,	2009;	Tehan,	2003).		In	comparison	to	the	NTA	legislated	under	the	Keating	Government,	the	1998	amendments	considerably	weakened	Indigenous	land	rights	(Behrendt	&	Strelein,	2001;	Ritter,	2009).	The	Aboriginal	and	Torres	Strait	Islander	Social	Justice	Commissioner’s	2008	annual	review	of	the	native	title	system	found	that	the	NTA	had	failed	to	deliver	justice	for	most	native	title	groups	(Marsh,	2013).	Native	title	claims	are	required	to	pass	a	number	of	stages	to	become	fully	recognised.	The	Federal	Court	makes	the	final	determination	based	on	the	proof	of	connection.	However,	it	can	take	a	number	of	years	for	a	native	title	application	to	reach	this	stage	(NNTT,	2009a).	Before	the	application	reaches	the	Federal	Court,	the	NNTT	assesses	whether	the	application	meets	the	requirements	to	become	registered.	Registered	native	title	applicants	possess	a	number	of	procedural	rights.	The	procedural	rights	given	to	the	applicants	depend	on	the	conditions	of	the	proposed	development.	If	a	development	is	deemed	unlikely	to	affect	the	claim	area,	the	applicants	may	only	possess	the	right	to	be	notified	or	to	lodge	an	objection	(QSNTS,	2017;	NTSCORP,	2017).	However,	if	a	development	is	likely	to	infringe	native	title	rights,	the	right	to	negotiate	(RTN)	may	ensue.	This	procedural	right	requires	the	grantee	party	to	conduct	negotiations	with	the	native	title	applicants	to	establish	a	legally	binding	agreement	(NNTT,	2016,	2017c;	NTSCORP,	2017).	The	negotiation	phases	examined	in	this	thesis	involve	the	RTN.	The	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	has	been	deemed	a	significant	development	that	will	impact	the	area	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claim.	As	this	claim	is	registered	
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with	the	NNTT,	negotiations	between	Adani	and	the	claim	group	are	mandated	under	the	provisions	of	the	NTA.			
Theoretical	Perspective:	A	Multifaceted	Approach	
A	number	of	theoretical	perspectives	will	be	employed	to	explain	the	outcomes	of	this	thesis.	The	complexity	of	this	specific	case	warrants	multiple	modes	to	provide	insight	into	the	outcomes	of	this	study.		The	following	theories	will	be	summarised	in	this	section:	
• Will	Kymlicka’s	liberal	culturalist	theory	of	minority	rights	
• Allen	Buchanan’s	essay	on	collective	land	rights	
• Critical	Race	Theory	(CRT)		
 
Will	Kymlicka:	Liberal	Culturalism	
Will	Kymlicka’s	theoretical	perspective	in	his	book	Multicultural	Citizenship	(1995),	situates	multiculturalism	within	a	liberal	framework.	He	argues	that	collective	rights	for	minorities	are	justified	in	liberal-democratic	societies	to	preserve	and	protect	cultural	traditions	and	practices	(Kymlicka,	1995).	Kymlicka’s	theory	of	minority	rights	postulates	that	liberal	principles	inherently	justify	collective	rights	for	these	groups	(Kymlicka,	1995).	There	is	now	a	consensus	among	liberal	theorists	that	collective	rights	for	minorities	are	consistent	with	liberal	principles.	Liberals	who	support	this	argument	are	classified	as	‘liberal	culturalists’.	It	is	the	moral	grounds,	or	justification,	for	minority	rights	that	remains	contested	among	liberal	culturalists	(Kymlicka,	2001).		Kymlicka	justifies	collective	rights	on	the	basis	of	cultural	membership	and	its	capacity	to	deliver	the	basic	liberal	principles	of	individual	freedom	and	autonomy.	He	argues	that	individual	freedom,	which	is	central	to	liberalism,	is	intrinsically	linked	to	culture	(Kymlicka,	1995,	2001).	To	explain	this	connection,	Kymlicka	describes	the	existence	of	societal	cultures.	‘Societal	cultures’	describes	a	society	that	is	territorially	concentrated,	has	common	economic,	political	and	educational	institutions,	a	shared	history	and	a	
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standardised	language	(Kymlicka,	1995,	2001).	Gaining	membership	to	a	societal	culture	allows	an	individual	to	have	access	to	“meaningful	ways	of	life	across	the	full	range	of	human	activities”	(Kymlicka,	1995,	p.	76).	If	an	individual	leaves	its	societal	culture	and	joins	a	new	societal	culture,	they	will	be	confronted	with	a	different	set	of	common	institutions,	a	different	common	language	and	different	‘culturally	significant’	ways	of	life.		The	link	between	liberalism	and	cultural	membership	in	Kymlicka’s	theory	emerges	from	the	freedom	of	choice,	which	is	fundamental	to	liberal	theory.	In	liberal	societies,	the	individual	is	free	to	choose	and	revise	their	own	conception	of	the	good	life	(Kymlicka,	1995).	‘The	good	life’	represents	an	individual’s	own	perception	of	a	fulfilling	life,	as	shaped	by	the	options	made	available	to	them.	As	societal	cultures	provide	meaningful	options	for	their	members,	in	terms	of	the	various	ways	they	can	lead	their	lives,	it	becomes	an	inherent	right	for	individuals	to	be	granted	membership	in	a	societal	culture	to	obtain	the	freedom	of	choice	(Kymlicka,	1995).	Members	of	a	societal	culture	attach	value	to	the	options	available	to	them	and	from	within	this	context	decide	on	their	current	conception	of	the	good	life.	Thus,	without	access	to	a	societal	culture,	individuals	are	deprived	of	their	right	to	the	freedom	of	choice.	The	ability	to	choose	their	conception	of	the	good	life	becomes	significantly	diminished	when	cultural	membership	fails	to	be	obtained	(Kymlicka,	1995).		Individuals	who	do	not	obtain	cultural	membership	to	a	societal	culture	are	more	likely	to	become	marginalised	within	that	society.	As	Kymlicka	argues,	“if	a	culture	is	decaying	or	discriminated	against,	‘the	options	and	opportunities	open	to	its	members	will	shrink,	become	less	attractive,	and	their	pursuit	[of	the	good	life]	less	likely	to	be	successful’.”	(Margaret	&	Raz	cited	in	Kymlicka,	1995,	p.	89).	Cultural	membership	is	therefore	fundamental	to	individual	freedom.	This	connection	frames	Kymlicka’s	initial	argument	for	collective	rights	in	liberal	societies.		Kymlicka’s	second	justification	for	collective	rights	is	based	on	the	liberal	principle	of	equality.	Kymlicka	perceives	minority	groups	as	the	bearers	of	an	inherent	and	unchosen	inequality	due	to	the	majoritarian	nature	of	societies	(Kymlicka,	1995).	Liberal	theory	supports	the	notion	that	all	citizens	deserve	to	have	equal	rights.	In	traditional	liberal	theory,	this	means	individual	rights	
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should	be	equally	disseminated	among	all	members	of	a	society,	regardless	of	ethnicity	or	race	(Kymlicka,	1995,	2001).	However,	Kymlicka	highlights	that	individual	rights	alone	do	not	ensure	equality	but	rather	perpetuate	inequality.	What	maintains	this	inequality	is	the	tendency	for	liberal	democracies	to	make	decisions	that	appeal	to	the	needs	and	desires	of	the	majority	(Kymlicka,	1995).		For	Indigenous	groups	living	within	a	larger	societal	culture,	decisions	that	favour	the	majority	can	threaten	the	survival	of	their	own	pre-existing	societal	culture	(Kymlicka,	1995,	2001).	In	absence	of	collective	rights	to	protect	Indigenous	traditions,	members	of	this	group	risk	losing	their	cultural	membership.	As	cultural	membership	is	required	to	ensure	individual	freedom	and	autonomy,	Indigenous	people	suffer	a	deep	inequality	due	to	majoritarian	decisions	(Kymlicka,	1995,	2001).	Kymlicka’s	theory	creates	a	mandate	for	liberal	democracies	to	accommodate	collective	rights	in	order	to	satisfy	the	liberal	principles	of	individual	freedom	and	equality.			
Allen	Buchanan:	Collective	Land	Rights	
Allen	Buchanan’s	theory	on	collective	land	rights	for	Indigenous	groups	relies	less	on	the	principles	of	liberalism	to	advocate	for	these	rights.	Buchanan	in	his	essay,	The	Role	of	Collective	Rights	in	the	Theory	of	Indigenous	Peoples’	
Rights	(1993),	distinguishes	two	types	of	collective	land	rights	that	limit	the	power	of	the	state	and	government	to	varying	degrees.	The	first	is	collective	property	rights,	which	provide	the	same	function	as	individual	title	but	with	collective	ownership.	The	second	is	collective	land	regulatory	rights,	which	embody	a	greater	capacity	to	control	resources	and	development.	The	latter	threatens	the	authority	of	the	state	and	government,	as	the	right-holder	has	the	power	to	regulate	the	use	of	the	land	(Buchanan,	1993).	The	Australian	native	title	system	resembles	the	former,	as	the	government	has	the	authority	to	proceed	with	development	without	the	consent	of	Indigenous	groups	on	the	grounds	of	public	interest.		Buchanan	contends	that	there	is	a	need	to	adopt	collective	rights	for	Indigenous	groups,	as	the	rights	attributed	solely	to	individuals	in	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	fail	to	recognise	people	of	a	distinctly	
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different	history	and	culture	(Buchanan,	1993).	The	Declaration	treats	all	individuals	as	equal	rights-holders.	However,	Buchanan	argues	that	the	history	and	culture	of	distinct	groups	such	as	Indigenous	peoples	warrants	collective	rights	to	protect	pre-existing	ways	of	life.		Buchanan	predominately	justifies	collective	land	rights	for	Indigenous	groups	on	three	grounds.	Collective	land	rights	can	be	justified	as	the	initial	step	to	reconcile	historical	injustice;	a	restoration	of	the	collective	property	system	that	existed	prior	to	colonialism;	and	a	means	to	ensure	the	survival	of	an	Indigenous	culture	(Buchanan,	1993).	These	justifications	have	a	strong	focus	on	reconciliation	with	Indigenous	groups	that	have	experienced	dispossession	of	land.	His	essay	explores	some	of	the	motivations	behind	Indigenous	demands	for	collective	land	rights.	A	major	factor	is	the	desire	to	have	pre-existing	methods	of	land	ownership	prior	to	the	advent	of	colonialism	returned	into	practice.		Buchanan	does	make	an	additional	justification	based	on	the	importance	of	cultural	membership.	As	culture	provides	meaningful	options	to	individuals,	the	preservation	of	culture	ensures	that	cultural	membership	is	maintained	(Buchanan,	1993).	This	final	premise	overlaps	with	Kymlicka’s	justification	for	collective	rights	within	the	liberal	principles	of	freedom	and	autonomy,	for	which	cultural	membership	is	a	central	component.		While	Kymlicka	and	Buchanan’s	theories	do	provide	some	similar	moral	grounds	for	collective	rights,	the	predominant	justifications	in	both	theories	largely	differ.	Kymlicka	seeks	justification	within	the	principles	of	liberalism	whereas	Buchanan	bases	his	reasoning	on	the	rectification	of	past	injustice	and	reconciliation.	However,	both	theories	can	be	attributed	to	the	broader	framework	of	liberal	culturalism.				
Critical	Race	Theory	
Critical	race	theory	(CRT)	is	a	subset	of	critical	theory	that	examines	the	role	of	race,	racism	and	power	in	society.	CRT	views	race	as	an	influential	factor	in	the	outcome	of	legal	cases	(Bell,	1995;	Darity,	2007).	In	its	initial	years,	the	movement	criticised	the	legal	system	in	the	United	States	for	reinforcing	racism	and	inequality.	However,	this	perspective	has	expanded	to	examine	the	
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role	of	race	in	other	disciplines	such	as	political	science	and	education.	Critical	race	theorists	view	racism	as	a	construct	that	is	engrained	in	the	social	fabric	of	Western	capitalist	societies	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012).		Despite	the	presence	of	laws	that	aim	to	counter	discrimination	and	inequality	such	as	affirmative	action	regimes,	subtle	forms	of	racism	remain	embedded	in	state	institutions	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Hutchinson,	2004).	Critical	race	theorists	share	the	belief	that	race	is	a	common	and	ordinary	occurrence.	It	is	a	phenomenon	that	is	normalised	and	embedded	into	everyday	life,	which	often	makes	it	difficult	to	detect	for	those	living	in	the	majority	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Gillborn,	2005).	While	explicit	forms	of	racism	such	as	denying	the	right	to	vote	have	been	curtailed	with	modern	anti-discrimination	laws,	CRT	contends	that	business-as-usual	racism	remains	deeply	prevalent	in	society.	This	form	of	racism	is	institutionalised	and	ensures	that	power	remains	in	the	hands	of	the	dominant	white	class	(Bracey,	2015;	Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Gillborn,	2005).		CRT	contends	that	state	institutions	and	government	consciously	and	unconsciously	ensure	that	white	people	continue	to	dominate	positions	of	power	and	maintain	control	over	material	resources	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Gillborn,	2005).	Bell	(1980)	establishes	the	concept	of	interest	convergence,	whereby	racial	remedies	for	blacks	are	accommodated	on	the	basis	that	the	rights	afforded	to	them	are	compatible	with	the	interests	of	whites.	At	the	very	least,	black	rights	must	not	jeopardise	white	interests.	Harris	(1993)	builds	on	this	idea,	arguing	that	over	time	the	legal	system	has	legitimised	white	privilege	and	a	set	of	power-based	presumptions	are	inherently	attached	to	all	whites.	Thus,	racial	remedies	will	be	amended	or	reversed	if	they	disrupt	the	white	expectation	of	power	and	control	(Bell,	1980;	Bracey,	2015;	Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012).	Bracey	(2015)	cites	Bell	(2004)	in	his	analysis	on	the	white	class	and	its	dominance	over	state	affairs,	“Whites’	control	of	the	state	is	permanent	and	absolute,	as	evinced	by	their	collective	power	to	abrogate	racial	justice	policies	‘at	the	point	that	policymakers	fear	the	remedial	policy	is	threatening	the	superior	social	status	of	whites’.”	(p.	558).		CRT	can	be	applied	to	the	Australian	context	to	understand	the	winding	back	of	Indigenous	land	rights	afforded	under	the	NTA.	The	native	title	system	
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essentially	represents	a	bundle	of	rights	granted	to	blacks.	However,	these	rights	are	carried	out	in	white	institutions	and	are	subject	to	the	decisions	of	white-dominated	political	leaderships.	When	native	title	rights	have	been	found	to	challenge	the	power	and	control	that	government	exerts	over	land,	the	legislation	is	amended	and	‘watered	down’.	As	critical	race	theorists	Delgado	and	Stefancic	(2012)	purport,	“rights	are	almost	always	cut	back	when	they	conflict	with	the	interests	of	the	powerful”	(p.	29).		This	is	illustrated	in	the	Howard	Government’s	amendments	to	weaken	the	NTA	following	the	Wik	decision.	The	Federal	Government’s	scramble	to	amend	the	Act	in	response	to	the	recent	McGlade	decision	also	demonstrates	the	reluctance	of	political	leaders	to	situate	black	interests	ahead	of	large	mining	developments	on	traditional	land.	The	decision	of	former	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating	to	legislate	native	title	rather	than	allow	Mabo	to	determine	the	outcome	of	similar	court	challenges	by	way	of	common	law	further	supports	the	arguments	of	CRT.	As	reflected	in	these	examples,	CRT	would	contend	that	whites	accommodate	racial	remedies	on	the	basis	that	it	does	not	harm	the	interests	of	white	institutions	and	government.		It	can	also	be	observed	that	the	rights	included	in	the	NTA,	particularly	in	the	future	act	process	this	thesis	examines,	can	be	overridden	if	the	interests	of	traditional	owners	obstruct	the	interests	of	those	in	power.	Thus,	while	black	rights	have	been	accommodated	to	remedy	past	wrongdoings	and	set	the	nation	on	a	path	towards	reconciliation,	these	rights	have	been	crafted	to	remain	subordinate	to	the	powers	of	the	white	dominant	class.			
Research	Questions	and	Thesis	Structure	
Research	question:		
• To	what	extent	have	state	institutions	and	government	taken	into	account	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	phases	of	approval	for	the	Adani	Carmichael	Coal	Mine?				
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Research	sub-questions:	
• What	degree	of	power	and	influence	do	resource	companies	like	Adani	exercise	in	Australian	politics?	(Chapter	2)	
• What	factors	contributed	to	the	collapse	of	negotiations?	(Chapter	3	and	4)	
• Why	did	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	become	divided	in	the	course	of	negotiations?	(Chapter	4)	
• How	did	the	NNTT,	the	State	Government	and	Adani	respond	to	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	phases	of	approval?	(Chapter	4	and	5)	
• To	what	extent	have	Members	of	Parliament	taken	into	consideration	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	phases	of	approval?	(Chapter	5)		Chapter	Two	will	examine	the	degree	of	power	resource	companies	exert	in	Australian	politics	and	determine	whether	Adani	reflects	a	similar	level	of	influence.				Chapter	Three	will	examine	how	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	operated	under	the	NTA	and	determine	what	factors	contributed	to	the	unresolved	outcome.		Chapter	Four	will	examine	the	next	phase	of	approval,	whereby	the	failure	to	produce	an	agreement	leads	to	the	involvement	of	the	State.	This	chapter	will	investigate	the	process	of	arbitration	and	the	community	division	that	emerged	thereafter.		Chapter	Five	will	examine	the	response	of	Adani	and	the	State	Government	when	negotiations	fail	to	produce	an	agreement	and	arbitration	is	sought	for	a	second	time.	This	chapter	will	then	investigate	the	degree	of	recognition	and	oversight	of	Indigenous	issues	by	government	in	the	approval	process	and	discuss	the	effect	of	the	recent	McGlade	decision.		The	concluding	chapter	will	compare	the	findings	of	this	study	to	the	existing	literature	and	assess	the	capacity	for	each	theory	to	explain	the	research	outcomes.			
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Methodology	
Document	Analysis	Document	analysis	is	a	common	methodology	employed	in	qualitative	studies.	It	involves	the	systematic	analysis	of	organisational	and	institutional	documents	to	build	understanding	and	contextualise	events	and	phenomena.	The	process	requires	the	selection	of	multiple	documents	relevant	to	the	research	problem	and	the	evaluation	and	synthesis	of	the	data	found	in	those	documents	(Bowen,	2009).			This	thesis	will	use	document	analysis	to	investigate	a	single	case	study.	This	type	of	methodology	is	often	used	in	case	study	research	to	develop	an	understanding	of	a	specific	phenomenon	or	event.	In	this	case,	a	range	of	documents	will	be	reviewed	and	evaluated	to	detail	each	phase	of	approval.	Comparing	the	data	in	each	document	will	aim	to	verify	and	confirm	important	information	about	the	approval	process	and,	in	turn,	determine	the	extent	to	which	state	institutions	and	government	have	taken	into	account	Indigenous	rights	and	interests,	and	if	this	is	a	sufficient	protection	of	these	rights	and	interests.		
Case	Study	Case	study	research	involves	the	in-depth	analysis	of	a	single	sample.	This	methodology	requires	detailed	and	descriptive	content	about	one	specific	phenomenon	or	event	(Pierce,	2008).	This	thesis	will	examine	a	single	instance	where	state	institutions	and	government	have	had	to	consider	the	rights	and	interests	of	an	Indigenous	group	in	the	approval	process	of	a	significant	mining	development	project.		The	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	is	a	highly	exposed	and	polarising	example	of	a	recent	large	mining	development	that	has	placed	the	Australian	native	title	system	under	the	lens	and	tested	the	existing	legislation.	This	thesis	aims	to	develop	broad	conclusions	that	may	be	applied	to	other	instances	where	a	large	mining	development	has	challenged	the	State	and	government’s	consideration	of	Indigenous	rights	and	interests.		
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Employment	of	Theory	This	thesis	will	employ	multiple	theories	to	interpret	and	understand	the	outcomes	of	a	single	case	study.	While	each	theoretical	perspective	will	be	applied	to	develop	a	critical	understanding	of	the	findings,	the	practical	implementation	of	each	framework	will	assess	its	applicability	in	a	real	life	event.	The	application	of	multiple	theories	that	are	relevant	to	the	research	problem	is	intended	to	provide	explanation	and	insight	into	the	response	of	state	institutions	and	government.		
Problem	and	Significance	
This	thesis	will	determine	the	extent	to	which	state	institutions	and	government	have	taken	into	account	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	during	the	approval	process	of	a	large	mining	development.	It	will	determine	whether	Indigenous	land	rights	in	Australia	have	fully	mandated	the	consideration	of	Indigenous	rights	and	interests	in	each	phase	of	approval.	A	series	of	theoretical	perspectives	will	be	employed	to	explain	the	research	outcomes.	This	study	will	compare	a	recent	case	to	the	existing	body	of	literature	on	Indigenous	land	rights	and	mining	developments	in	Australia.	The	findings	may	confirm	or	counter	the	literature	and	may	also	support	or	challenge	the	criticisms	of	the	NTA	as	a	weak	apparatus	for	Indigenous	groups	seeking	to	protect	their	rights	to	land.			The	use	of	multiple	theories	to	explain	the	outcomes	of	the	approval	process	offers	an	additional	contribution	to	the	literature.	There	are	a	number	of	studies	that	examine	cases	where	the	interests	of	Indigenous	groups	and	the	rights	afforded	to	them	under	the	NTA	and	the	UNDRIP	have	been	affected	by	mining	developments	(Altman,	2009;	Corbett	&	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006,	2008;	Scambary,	2013).	However,	theoretical	perspectives	have	been	scarcely	employed	to	explain	the	inadequacies	of	Indigenous	land	rights	in	Australia’s	jurisdiction	and	the	attitudes	of	state	institutions	and	government.		While	there	appears	to	be	a	consensus	in	the	literature	that	the	NTA	has	failed	to	uphold	Indigenous	rights	and	interests,	there	are	few	studies	that	provide	a	
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deeper	source	of	explanation	beyond	the	inherent	weaknesses	of	the	legislation.	This	thesis	seeks	to	account	for	the	failure	of	the	native	title	system	using	the	application	of	multiple	social	theories.																						
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Chapter	2	
Resource	Politics	
Australia	is	a	resource-rich	nation	and	the	energy	and	mining	industry	has	contributed	significantly	to	the	national	economy.	While	it	is	a	common	misconception	that	Australia’s	economy	is	largely	bound	to	expendable	energy	and	mining	production,	the	mining	sector	only	contributes	around	8	per	cent	to	the	nation’s	GDP	(Frydenberg,	2015;	Garnett,	2015;	Roarty,	2010).	However,	the	resources	sector	continues	to	occupy	a	prominent	position	on	the	national	agenda	as	it	delivers	many	benefits	to	the	state,	contributing	to	export	earnings,	employment,	foreign	and	domestic	investment,	and	to	government	revenue	(Roarty,	2010).		The	national	reliance	on	energy	and	mining	has	enabled	large	resource	companies	to	become	highly	influential	in	Australian	politics	(Baer,	2014;	Hodder,	2009;	Lyons,	2016).	The	carbon	lobby	has	exercised	significant	power	to	influence	key	policymakers	and	public	opinion.	While	the	government	ensures	transparency	for	certain	lobbying	practices,	many	cases	of	lobbying	are	conducted	off	the	record	(Readfearn,	2015).	The	mining	industry	engages	in	a	high	level	of	government	lobbying	and	enjoys	a	close	relationship	with	the	Australian	Government.	There	is	a	revolving	door	whereby	individuals	move	between	positions	in	the	resource	industry	and	public	office.	This	close	exchange	may	compromise	the	independence	of	government	decision-making	and	increase	the	influence	of	energy	and	mining	interests	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Hodder,	2009;	Readfearn,	2015).	The	conduct	of	Adani	mirrors	the	approach	of	many	large	resource	companies	that	have	aimed	to	influence	Australian	politics.	Adani	has	employed	multiple	lobbying	strategies,	including	monetary	donations,	personal	gifts,	private	meetings	and	the	strategic	hiring	of	several	former	government	executives	of	Queensland	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Cox,	2015b;	Readfearn,	2015).	Adani	has	received	widespread	criticism	by	countless	interest	groups	locally	and	Australia-wide.	Despite	sustained	opposition	to	the	Carmichael	Project	and	the	refusal	of	Australian-owned	banks	to	finance	the	project,	the	Queensland	Government	has	continued	to	tender	approvals	(Bell-James,	2015;	Haxton,	2015;	Milman,	2015;	Tlozek,	2015).	This	raises	the	question	as	to	whether	the	
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decision	to	issue	controversial	grants	and	approvals	are	made	independently	and	with	equal	consideration	of	other	interest	groups	that	do	not	enjoy	the	same	access	to	government	as	the	energy	and	mining	industry.			Australia	produces	a	wide	range	of	energy	sources,	including	oil,	coal,	aluminum	and	iron	ore.	The	nation	strongly	relies	on	coal	as	a	source	of	electricity	and	export	(Baer,	2014;	Healey,	2012).	Australia’s	domestic	use	of	coal	to	generate	electricity	ranks	it	fifth	in	the	world.	Coal	generates	85	per	cent	of	grid-connected	electricity	across	the	nation,	and	prior	to	2011	Australia	was	the	world’s	largest	coal	exporter	(Hodder,	2009;	Baer,	2014;	Crowley,	2013).	Australia	currently	provides	30	per	cent	of	coal	exports	around	the	globe.	While	Australia’s	global	reputation	as	an	energy	and	mining	powerhouse	situates	it	among	the	world’s	resource	heavyweights	such	as	China,	the	United	States	and	India,	mineral	resources	in	Australia	seldom	belong	to	local	mining	industries	and	instead	rest	in	the	hands	of	a	few	majority	foreign-owned	transnational	corporations	(Goodman	&	Worth,	2008).	These	large	energy	and	mining	companies	enjoy	a	close	relationship	with	the	Australian	Government	and	have	the	economic	power	to	devote	millions	towards	lobbying	for	their	interests.	Energy	and	mining	companies	lobby	the	government	either	directly	or	through	lobbying	firms.	Lobbying	can	include	contributions	to	political	parties,	gifts,	private	meetings	or	media	engagement	(Baer,	2014;	Hodder,	2009).	It	is	a	legal	requirement	that	certain	lobbying	practices	are	recorded	on	a	formal	public	register.	However,	many	operate	outside	this	requirement	and	remain	undisclosed	to	the	public.	Australian	law	does	not	require	political	donations	under	$12,100	to	be	formally	registered	and	this	highlights	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	system	(Readfearn,	2015).	Lobbying	conducted	in	secrecy	is	a	common	and	concerning	practice	that	increases	the	opportunity	for	misconduct	and	institutional	corruption.	Transparency	of	governance	is	reduced	and	accountability	diminishes	when	lobbying	activities	are	not	formally	recorded.	There	is	an	entrusted	expectation	that	government	officials	will	make	decisions	independent	of	influence	and	in	the	interests	of	the	public.			Liberal	democratic	governance	is	based	on	transparency	and	accountability.	Fukuyama	(2015)	states	that	democratic	accountability	“seeks	to	ensure	that	government	acts	in	the	interests	of	the	whole	community,	rather	than	simply	
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in	the	self-interest	of	the	rulers”	(p.	12).	When	the	government’s	actions	seek	to	benefit	the	whole	community,	the	public	interest	is	prioritised	and	the	moral	legitimacy	of	the	democratic	system	is	upheld	(Beresford,	2010).	However,	when	the	government	makes	decisions	in	favour	of	other	interest	groups	rather	than	the	public	interest,	its	moral	legitimacy	becomes	compromised.	Institutional	corruption	can	manifest	when	the	government	is	less	accountable	to	the	public.	Government	accountability	is	maintained	through	transparency	and	when	a	democracy	lacks	transparency,	it	becomes	vulnerable	to	institutional	corruption.	A	high	level	of	public	disclosure	ensures	that	government	officials	remain	accountable	and	decisions	are	made	with	the	public	interest	at	heart	(Beresford,	2010).	Australia’s	weak	lobbying	laws	reduce	transparency	and	increase	the	risk	of	institutional	corruption.	The	power	of	the	carbon	lobby	unveils,	to	some	extent,	the	uneven	influence	energy	and	mining	companies	have	over	government	decisions	and	party	policies.	Perhaps	the	most	straightforward	form	of	lobbying	is	monetary	donations	to	political	parties.	Political	donations	on	the	surface	appear	to	be	a	one-way	flow	of	funds	from	a	donor	to	a	recipient,	in	good	faith	and	impartial	of	vested	interests.	However,	political	donations	are	more	realistically	viewed	as	single	or	multiple	transactions	by	which	the	donor	gives	and	then	gains	something	in	return.	Political	donations	are	often	made	to	gain	some	degree	of	political	advantage	(Hodder,	2009).	Energy	and	mining	companies	donate	with	the	expectation	that	political	parties	will	favour	their	developments	and	expedite	approvals.	Large	and	sustained	political	donations	are	a	concerning	practice,	as	it	introduces	bias	into	the	decision-making	process	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016).	In	some	cases,	it	can	be	observed	that	political	donations	correspond	with	favourable	decisions	for	the	donors.		Political	donations	in	Australia	are	legal	and	commonplace	(Hodder,	2009).	Mining	and	energy	companies	have	made	sizable	donations	to	both	sides	of	politics.	Since	the	1980s,	the	Liberal	and	Labor	parties	have	received	millions	in	corporate	donations	(Baer,	2014;	McKnight	&	Hobbs,	2013).	Mining	companies	have	made	donations	directly	and	indirectly	through	industry	lobby	groups	and	associations.	The	Australian	Coal	Association	(ACA)	represents	coal	mining	interests	in	Queensland	and	New	South	Wales	and	has	made	large	donations	to	both	major	political	parties	since	the	1990s	(Baer,	
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2014;	Hodder,	2009).	Other	industry	lobby	groups	such	as	the	Australian	Industry	Greenhouse	Network	(AIGN),	a	cross-industry	group	representing	several	major	energy	and	mining	corporations,	has	donated	millions	to	the	Liberal	Party	and	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	since	1998	(Baer,	2014;	Hodder,	2009).	The	mining	industry	is	a	wealthy	conglomerate	of	transnational	corporations	and	lobbyists	that	can	afford	to	donate	millions	to	increase	the	likeliness	that	policy	leans	in	their	favour.				There	have	been	two	reports	released	that	examine	the	Queensland	Government’s	lack	of	transparency	and	disclosure	of	lobbying	activities.	Readfearn’s	(2015)	report	on	the	political	influence	of	coal	and	gas	lobbyists	in	Queensland	uncovered	a	string	of	generous	donations	to	the	Liberal	National	Party	(LNP).	In	2007,	when	the	government	rejected	the	Australian	energy	company	New	Hope’s	proposal	to	expand	its	Darling	Downs	coal	mine,	the	company	donated	$950,000	to	the	Federal	Liberal	Party	between	2008	and	2011.	In	2014,	New	Hope’s	expansion	was	approved	under	the	LNP	Newman	Government	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Readfearn,	2015).	This	example	illustrates	how	large	donations	to	political	parties	can	influence	key	decision-makers	in	government	and,	in	turn,	effectuate	corporate	objectives.			Aulby	and	Ogge’s	(2016)	report	examines	the	legislative	outcomes	in	specific	cases	where	the	Queensland	Government	has	been	exposed	to	multiple	lobbying	tactics.	The	findings	of	the	report	observe	a	significant	disparity	between	mining	related	donations	to	the	Federal	ALP	and	the	Federal	Liberal	Party.	Between	2011	and	2015,	the	Labor	Party	accepted	approximately	$1.2	million	whereas	the	Liberal	Party	accepted	nearly	$3	million.	During	this	time,	there	were	six	controversial	mining	developments	pending	approval	in	Newman-led	Queensland.	The	LNP	Newman	Government	received	over	$1	million	from	the	mining	industry	over	the	same	period	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016).	Corresponding	with	their	generous	donations	to	the	LNP	and	Federal	Liberal	Party,	the	mining	companies	seeking	approvals	in	Queensland	received	desirable	legislative	outcomes	under	the	LNP	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016).	It	is	clear	that	political	parties	routinely	receive	large	donations	from	the	mining	sector	and	such	contributions	can	compromise	independent	and	unbiased	decision-making.			
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Evidence	of	the	link	between	political	donations	and	government	decisions	casts	doubts	upon	the	level	of	institutional	corruption	at	work	in	Australian	politics.	While	sizable	donations	from	a	multiplicity	of	corporations	in	the	mining	industry	have	flowed	into	the	pockets	of	political	parties	for	years,	governments	have	acted	favourably	in	return.	The	Australian	Government	has	given	energy	and	mining	companies	large	subsidies	for	their	developments	and	expansion	(Baer,	2014).	Government	expenditure	on	subsidies	for	the	mining	sector	is	an	expensive	investment.	The	Queensland	Government	spent	$9	billion	on	mining	projects	between	2009	and	2014	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016).		Energy	and	mining	companies	enjoy	a	privileged	level	of	access	to	government	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Hodder,	2009;	Readfearn,	2015).	Industry	leaders	can	pay	for	access	to	events	where	politicians	are	present	(Readfearn,	2015).	In	Queensland,	both	the	LNP	and	Labor	have	established	subscription-based	schemes	where	corporations	‘buy-in’	to	attend	exclusive	events	with	key	politicians.	Labor’s	Queensland	Progressive	Business	Network	(QPBN)	scheme	charged	corporations	$10,000	a	year	for	a	subscription	to	events.	The	LNP’s	QForum	scheme	promised	corporations	such	as	Hancock	Coal,	Caltex	and	Peabody	Energy	one-on-one	access	to	ministers	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Readfearn,	2015).		These	‘cash	for	access’	schemes	have	been	kept	highly	secretive	and	are	not	inclusive	of	other	interest	groups	such	as	those	with	environmental	or	agricultural	concerns	(Readfearn,	2015).	The	establishment	of	QPBN	and	QForum	encourages	a	direct	engagement	with	government	that	can	go	unrecorded.	These	fundraising	forums	allow	the	lobbying	of	key	policymakers	to	be	conducted	behind	closed	doors,	without	disclosure	to	the	public.	As	Hodder	(2009)	asserts,	“Although	legal,	these	activities	are	generally	hidden	because	broad	exposure	would	reveal	the	disproportionate	access	and	influence	that	certain	powerful	actors	within	the	system	enjoy”	(p.	58).	Judging	the	independence	of	government	decision-making	becomes	problematic	when	direct	access	is	attainable	for	some	wealthy	interest	groups	and	not	others.	While	the	red	carpet	is	rolled	out	for	the	heads	of	energy	and	mining	companies	to	‘rub	shoulders’	with	key	decision-makers,	many	other	groups	do	not	enjoy	the	same	level	of	access	to	government	(Hodder,	2009).		
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There	is	a	revolving	door	between	the	resource	sector	and	the	public	office	of	government	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Readfearn,	2015).	In	many	cases,	former	Queensland	politicians	and	their	staff	have	left	government	to	work	as	lobbyists	for	energy	and	mining	firms	and	then	returned	to	politics	months	or	years	later.	The	opposite	has	also	occurred	where	lobbyists	for	the	resource	sector	have	obtained	influential	positions	in	public	office	and	then	returned	to	the	lobby	world.	The	unrestrained	movement	of	staff	between	the	public	office	and	the	resource	sector	raises	a	considerable	conflict	of	interest	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Readfearn,	2015).	It	is	concerning	when	politicians	tasked	with	regulating	development	are	found	to	have	held	prominent	positions	in	the	energy	and	mining	industry.	This	conflict	of	interest	may	lead	to	the	preferential	treatment	and	prioritisation	of	certain	development	projects	and	less	consideration	given	to	other	stakeholders	in	the	community.																			
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2012	-	2013	Financial	Year	 $6,600	to	LP	$7,200	to	ALP	 No	approvals	2013	-	2014	Financial	Year	 $49,500	to	LP	$11,000	to	ALP	 8	May	Queensland	approves	mine	2014	-	2015	Financial	Year	 $7,000	to	LNP	$5,500	to	ALP	 24	July	Commonwealth	approves	mine	
Adani	and	Australian	politics	
							
Consistent	with	the	experiences	of	numerous	energy	and	mining	companies,	Adani	has	enjoyed	direct	access	to	Australian	politicians,	ministers	and	bureaucrats.	Adani	has	actively	lobbied	the	Commonwealth	and	Queensland	Government	through	political	contributions,	gifts	to	ministers,	private	meetings	and	the	strategic	hiring	of	influential	former	government	executives	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Cox,	2015b;	Readfearn,	2015).	When	compared	with	the	lobbying	activities	of	other	multinational	corporations	that	have	a	vested	interest,	Adani	ticks	all	the	boxes.	The	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	has	made	its	way	through	Australia’s	approval	process,	whereby	the	State	and	Federal	Government	has	approved	and	re-approved	mining	leases	for	the	project	(Bell-James,	2015).	While	it	is	difficult	to	determine	whether	a	link	exists	between	the	lobbying	activities	of	Adani	and	the	tender	of	approvals,	it	is	evident	that	the	company	wields	a	disproportionate	influence	and	access	to	government	compared	to	many	other	interest	groups.		The	Electoral	Commission	of	Queensland	(ECQ)	revealed	Adani’s	contributions	to	both	sides	of	politics	over	the	past	five	years.	Contributions	on	the	ECQ’s	record	are	listed	for	each	financial	year.	In	the	2012-2013	financial	year	Adani	paid	$7,200	to	the	ALP	for	attendance	at	the	2013	Budget	Dinner	and	Post-Budget	Lunch	(ECQ,	2013).	In	the	same	period,	the	Federal	Liberal	Party	received	$6,600	for	attendance	at	a	business	advisory	lunch	(Australian	Electoral	Commission	[AEC],	2013).	Contributions	increase	
Figure	1.1	Adani's	contributions	to	political	parties	
LP:	Liberal	Party,	ALP:	Australian	Labor	Party,	LNP:	Liberal	National	Party	
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significantly	in	the	following	financial	year.	Between	2013-2014	Adani	paid	$49,500	to	the	Federal	Liberal	Party	and	$11,000	to	the	ALP	(AEC,	2014).	In	the	financial	year	2014-2015,	Adani	contributed	$7,000	to	the	LNP	and	$5,500	to	the	ALP.	The	ECQ	did	not	specify	a	reason	for	the	contributions	made	by	Adani	from	July	2013	to	June	2015	(ECQ,	2015).		Adani	operates	its	lobbying	through	Queensland-based	firm	Next	Level	Strategic	Services	(NLSS).	NLSS	has	made	contributions	to	the	LNP	in	excess	of	$52,000	since	2013	(ECQ,	2013a,	2014,	2015a,	2015b,	2016,	2016a).	While	Adani	is	one	of	10	clients	managed	by	NLSS	(Australian	Government,	2017),	the	contributions	these	firms	make	to	political	parties	promote	the	interests	of	the	companies	they	represent.	Based	on	the	premise	that	political	contributions	are	made	to	encourage	desirable	outcomes	for	the	donor,	the	approvals	issued	by	the	Commonwealth	and	Queensland	Government	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	in	May	and	July	of	2014	coincide	with	Adani’s	contributions	of	over	$60,000	to	the	Federal	Liberal	Party	and	ALP.	These	two	approvals	were	tendered	under	the	Newman	and	Abbott	governments.	In	comparison	to	the	contributions	made	to	the	ALP,	the	Liberal	Party	received	considerably	larger	contributions	prior	to	its	endorsement	of	the	Carmichael	Project.	In	August	2013,	the	Deputy	Premier	Jeff	Seeney	and	his	chief	of	staff	both	received	gifts	from	Adani	jointly	valued	at	over	$1,000	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Queensland	Government,	2013).	While	Adani’s	contributions	to	both	federal	and	state	divisions	of	political	parties	significantly	diminished	following	the	2013-2014	financial	year,	company	executives	continued	to	meet	regularly	with	ministers.	Adani	has	sustained	countless	private	meetings	with	the	heads	of	government	in	Queensland.	Between	2013	and	2014	Adani	had	12	private	meetings	with	ministers	of	the	Newman	Government,	including	six	meetings	with	the	Deputy	Premier	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016).	Since	the	defeat	of	the	Newman	Government	in	2015,	Adani	has	obtained	21	private	meetings	with	the	Palaszczuk	Ministry	and	the	Opposition	(Queensland	Integrity	Commissioner	[QIC],	2016).	Adani	has	met	with	policy	advisors	to	the	Queensland	Premier	Anastasia	Palaszczuk	on	eight	occasions	and	twice	with	the	Premier.	Policy	advisors	and	the	chief	of	staff	to	the	Minister	for	State	Development,	Natural	Resources	and	Mines,	Anthony	Lynham,	have	had	five	meetings	with	Adani,	one	meeting	including	
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the	Minister.	Other	private	meetings	involved	the	Deputy	Premier	Jackie	Trad,	the	Leader	of	the	Opposition	Tim	Nicholls,	several	Members	of	Parliament	and	the	Mayor	of	Townsville	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	QIC,	2016).	Adani	has	sustained	direct	access	to	both	sides	of	politics	in	Queensland.			Adani	has	pursued	a	range	of	internal	lobbying	tactics,	strategically	employing	former	government	executives	with	knowledge	relevant	to	the	oversight	of	developments.	There	are	a	number	of	staffers	working	for	Adani	that	have	strong	connections	to	the	major	political	parties	in	Queensland	(Cox,	2015b).	The	former	Deputy	Premier’s	chief	of	staff	David	Moore	and	former	Leader	of	the	Opposition’s	chief	of	staff	Cameron	Milner	jointly	own	the	lobbying	firm	NLSS	(Cox,	2015b;	Rose,	2015;	Readfearn,	2015).	NLSS	has	facilitated	private	meetings	between	Adani	and	the	government	(QIC,	2016).		Lobbyists	David	Moore	and	Cameron	Milner	have	held	a	number	of	influential	roles	in	public	office.	Moore	has	left	and	returned	to	government	several	times.	After	serving	as	John	Howard’s	chief	of	staff	for	10	years,	Moore	left	public	office	to	start	a	lobbying	firm.	He	then	left	the	private	sector	for	a	12-month	period	to	work	as	Campbell	Newman’s	chief	of	staff	in	2011	(NLSS,	2013).	Milner	entered	the	private	sector	after	working	as	the	ALP	state	secretary	in	Queensland.	He	left	his	position	as	co-director	at	NLSS	in	2015	to	serve	as	Bill	Shorten’s	chief	of	staff.	After	10	months,	Milner	returned	to	the	lobby	world	(Maiden,	2016;	NLSS,	2013).	Moore	and	Milner’s	movements	between	private	enterprise	and	public	office	reflect	the	revolving	door	between	government	and	the	resource	sector.		Adani	has	a	long	track	record	of	non-compliance	with	environmental	laws	overseas.	This	has	failed	to	deter	or	delay	the	Australian	Government’s	approvals	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	(Earth	Justice	&	Environmental	Justice	Australia,	2015;	Reside,	Mappin,	Watson,	Chapman	&	Kearney,	2016).	The	potential	environmental	impacts	of	the	development	will	put	at	risk	69,000	full-time	jobs	dependent	on	the	Great	Barrier	Reef	(Blain,	2016;	Moore,	2015;	Robertson,	2015a).	When	compared	to	an	estimated	1,500	full-time	jobs	generated	to	operate	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	(Branco,	2015a;	Campbell,	2015),	the	prospect	of	endangering	a	world	heritage	listed	site	and	major	tourism	hub	for	Australia	seems	an	unnecessary	and	high-risk	endeavour.	Moreover,	the	construction	of	the	world’s	second	largest	coal	mine	is	at	odds	
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with	the	global	awareness	of	climate	change	and	the	consequences	of	high	carbon	emission	developments	(Bell-James,	2015;	Blain,	2016;	Reside,	Mappin,	Watson,	Chapman	&	Kearney,	2016).		Despite	a	number	of	serious	allegations	against	Adani’s	mining	operations	overseas,	the	Australian	Government	has	continued	to	support	the	project	and	advance	its	approval.	Adani	currently	faces	numerous	allegations	of	financial	crime	and	corruption	involving	fraud,	money	laundering,	and	bribery	(Aulby	&	Ogge,	2016;	Long,	2016;	Robertson,	2016a).	The	company	has	struggled	to	secure	investment,	as	Australian	and	international	banks	have	been	reluctant	to	provide	funding.	There	have	already	been	11	international	banks	that	have	refused	to	invest	in	the	Carmichael	Project	(Haxton,	2015;	Milman,	2015;	Tlozek,	2015).		In	August	2015,	the	Australian	Commonwealth	Bank	suspended	its	role	as	Adani’s	financial	advisor.	This	is	a	significant	move	that	suggests	the	Commonwealth	Bank	views	the	development	as	commercially	unviable	(Tlozek,	2015).	The	Queensland	Treasury	has	raised	similar	concerns	and	has	deemed	the	project	‘unbankable’.	The	Treasury	has	highlighted	the	company’s	large	debts	and	this	has	cast	doubts	on	its	financial	capacity	to	deliver	the	proposed	project	(Cox,	2015).		Energy	and	financial	analysts	have	labelled	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	development	a	risky	investment	due	to	Adani’s	record	of	debt,	the	accusations	of	financial	crime	and	India’s	plan	to	discontinue	coal	imports	(Briggs,	2016;	Robertson	&	Safi,	2016).	The	Indian	Government	has	declared	it	intends	to	phase	out	coal	imports.	This	is	a	significant	policy	shift	that	the	Australian	Government	must	take	into	consideration.	Analysts	have	predicted	that	the	Carmichael	Project	will	become	a	‘stranded	asset’	if	India	continues	to	turn	to	alternatives	sources	of	energy	(Milman,	2015;	Long,	2016).	The	success	of	the	proposed	development	in	the	Galilee	Basin	is	dependent	on	India’s	coal	reliance.	The	prominence	of	coal	as	a	key	energy	source	for	electricity	in	India	is	becoming	an	increasingly	unlikely	prospect.		Adani’s	history	of	non-compliance	with	environmental	laws	doubled	with	numerous	allegations	of	financial	crime	greatly	challenges	its	suitability	to	operate	in	Australia.	However,	at	every	stage	the	Australian	Government	has	continued	to	issue	approvals	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine.	It	appears	the	only	
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setback	to	the	project	is	the	actions	of	concerned	interest	groups	that	have	held	the	government	and	Adani	to	account	(Wellington,	2016).	The	Federal	and	State	Government’s	undue	support	for	Adani	at	each	phase	of	the	approval	process,	despite	evidence	that	suggests	the	project	is	both	a	financially	and	environmentally	risky	investment	for	Australia,	raises	the	concern	that	the	actions	of	government	are	not	independent	of	influence.		The	Australian	Government	appears	to	have	ignored	all	the	warning	signs	and	has	unequivocally	handed	Adani	its	approvals.	In	consideration	of	the	consistent	lobbying	efforts	of	the	mining	giant	and	its	direct	access	to	key	policymakers,	it	is	possible	that	Adani	and	the	coal	lobby	have	exercised	a	disproportionate	level	of	influence	in	Australian	politics.	The	result	has	conceived	a	series	of	decision	outcomes	in	favour	of	the	second	largest	coal	development	in	the	world.			
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Chapter	3	
The	First	Phase	of	Negotiations	
Since	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	received	the	first	notification	of	the	Carmichael	Project	in	late	2011,	negotiations	took	a	prolonged	and	controversial	course.	The	task	of	reaching	an	agreement	involved	significant	state	intervention.	Within	a	five-year	period,	between	2012	and	2016,	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	rejected	three	Indigenous	Land	Use	Agreements	(ILUA)	put	forward	by	Adani	(Borschmann,	2015;	Davidson,	2017;	Robertson,	2016b).	Adani	approached	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT)	on	two	occasions	and	both	times	the	NNTT	delivered	a	ruling	in	favour	of	the	mining	leases.	Before	the	ILUA	was	signed	in	April	2016,	there	were	two	periods	of	negotiations	that	failed	to	produce	an	agreement.	The	first	between	May	2011	and	December	2012	concerned	the	mining	lease	(ML)	70441	(Adani	Mining	v.	
Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	The	second	between	October	2013	and	October	2014	concerned	two	additional	mining	leases,	ML	70505	and	ML	70506	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	Negotiations	on	both	counts	were	unable	to	secure	an	ILUA	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	The	collapse	of	negotiations	prompted	Adani	to	pass	the	matter	to	the	NNTT	twice,	a	move	that	delivered	desirable	outcomes	for	the	mining	giant	and	effectively	sidelined	the	concerns	of	the	Indigenous	group.		The	Native	Title	Act	(NTA)	has	established	a	two-pronged	system	that	consists	of	claims	and	future	acts.	Indigenous	groups	make	claims	that	are	either	determined,	pending	determination	(as	registered	or	unregistered	claims),	or	rejected.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	a	registered	claim	that	is	pending	determination	(NNTT,	2004).	The	future	act	system	operates	separately	from	claims	and	concerns	any	proposed	activity	that	may	infringe	native	title	rights	and	interests	(NNTT,	2017a).	Future	acts	include	activities	such	as	infrastructure,	mineral	exploration,	pastoral	leases	or	mining	projects	(QSNTS,	2017;	NNTT,	2009;	NTSCORP,	2017).		Registered	claimants	are	entitled	to	a	number	of	procedural	rights	in	relation	to	future	acts.	Procedural	rights	range	from	the	right	to	lodge	an	objection	to	the	right	to	negotiate	compensation	or	conditions	attached	to	a	future	act	
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(QSNTS,	2017;	NNTT,	2009;	NTSCORP,	2017).	The	level	of	procedural	rights	granted	depends	on	the	size	and	impact	of	the	future	act	and	its	proximity	to	the	claim	area.	As	mining	developments	can	lead	to	the	extinguishment	of	native	title,	the	NTA	mandates	that	the	mining	interest	negotiates	a	land	use	agreement	with	the	registered	claimants.	Where	resource	companies	seek	to	have	mining	leases	granted	for	new	projects	near	or	within	a	registered	claim	area,	the	right	to	negotiate	(RTN)	ensues	(NNTT,	2016,	2017c;	NTSCORP,	2017).	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	been	granted	the	RTN	as	the	proposed	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	resides	entirely	inside	their	registered	claim	area.	Negotiations	are	conducted	independently	between	the	native	title	applicant	and	the	mining	interest	(QSNTS,	2017).	When	a	native	title	application	is	made,	the	claimants	appoint	one	or	more	persons,	referred	to	as	the	‘applicant’,	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	group	as	a	whole.	The	claim	group	appoint	applicants	through	a	traditional	decision-making	process	or	an	appropriate	alternative	method	of	their	choice.	The	applicants	speak	on	behalf	of	the	claim	group	and	make	decisions	in	relation	to	the	claim	(Duff,	2017;	NNTT,	2008,	2009;	NTSCORP,	2012).		The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claimants,	who	constitute	400	to	500	people,	have	appointed	applicants	on	three	occasions	(Burragubba	&	Johnson,	2015;	de	Tarczynski,	2016;	Jishnu,	2015).	These	applicants	have	dealt	directly	with	Adani	in	the	course	of	negotiations.	The	NTA	requires	negotiations	to	be	conducted	for	a	minimum	of	six	months	before	parties	can	request	the	State	to	arbitrate	the	matter.	However,	negotiations	can	extend	for	any	length	of	time	provided	that	all	parties	continue	in	good	faith	of	reaching	an	agreement	(NNTT,	2008a,	2016;	NTSCORP,	2017).	Negotiations	in	both	cases	have	exceeded	the	six-month	minimum	and	Adani	has	requested	that	the	State	intervene.		This	chapter	will	involve	extensive	analysis	of	the	NNTT’s	future	act	determination	Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others	(2013)	to	examine	the	first	phase	of	negotiations.	This	primary	source	contains	a	detailed	chronology	of	correspondence	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	from	May	2011	to	December	2012.	It	is	a	significant	legal	document	that	exceeds	100	pages	and	recounts	the	series	of	disputes	that	led	to	the	collapse	
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of	negotiations.	While	this	document	provides	excerpts	of	correspondence,	such	as	emails,	letters	and	affidavits,	full	submissions	made	to	the	NNTT	are	not	publicly	available.	The	author	contacted	the	NNTT	and	requested	the	full	release	of	submissions	to	strengthen	this	analysis.	However,	none	were	made	available.	While	the	document	is	still	critical	for	this	study,	as	it	provides	a	comprehensive	account	of	negotiations,	the	denial	of	access	limits	the	transparency	of	the	process.	During	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	there	was	minimal	media	coverage	or	commentary	to	support	the	findings	of	the	NNTT’s	determination.	The	conclusions	made	in	this	chapter	have	been	formed	through	in	depth	analysis	of	the	available	evidence	in	Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	
Diver	&	Others	(2013).		
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2011	 • May	-	tirst	negotiation	phase	commences	• 2	November	-	notitication	of	mining	lease	for	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	
2012	 • 7	November	-	Adani	tiles	tirst	future	act	determination	application	• 29	November	-	Campbell	Newman	leads	seven-day	trade	mission	to	India	• 1	December	-	WJ	claimants	reject	ILUA	• December	-	tirst	negotiation	phase	concludes		
2013	 • 7	May	-	tirst	future	act	determination	(ML	70441	may	be	done)	• 30	October	-	notitication	of	two	mining	leases	for	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	• October	-	second	negotiation	phase	commences	
2014	
• 8	May	-	Queensland	Coordinator-General	approves	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	• 24	July	-	Federal	Environmental	Minister	approves	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	• 7	August	-	three	native	title	applicants	replace	seven	applicants	• 5	October	-	WJ	claimants	reject	ILUA	• 10	October	-	Adani	tiles	second	future	act	determination	application	• October	-	second	negotiation	phase	concludes	
2015	 • 5	April	-	second	future	act	determination	(ML	70505,	70506	may	be	done)	• 21	August	-	12	native	title	applicants	replace	three	applicants	• 2	October	-	WJ	Family	Council	make	submission	to	United	Nations		• 14	October	-	Federal	Environmental	Minister	re-approves	mine	
2016	 • 19	March	-	ILUA	is	rejected	at	a	claim	group	meeting	• 3	April	-	Queensland	Government	issue	ML	70441,	70505,	70506	to	Adani	• 16	April	-	ILUA	is	authorised	at	a	contested	Adani-convened	meeting	• 22	June	-	NNTT	registers	ILUA	and	WJ	Family	Council	lodge	objection	• 19	August	-	Federal	Court	rejects	WJ	Family	Council's	judicial	review	• 25	November	-	Supreme	Court	rejects	WJ	Family	Counci's	judicial	review	
2017	 • 2	February	-	McGlade	decision	• ILUA	authorised	in	April	2016	may	be	invalidated	
Figure	2.2	Adani	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	development	timeline	
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Negotiation	Breakdown	
The	first	phase	of	negotiations	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	failed	to	produce	an	agreement.	Based	on	the	available	evidence,	it	appears	that	the	native	title	applicants	had	negotiated	in	good	faith	of	reaching	an	agreement	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	The	applicants	did	not	abandon	or	disengage	from	negotiations	at	any	stage,	but	continued	to	work	towards	an	ILUA	that	would	create	long-term	benefits	for	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community.	The	failure	to	settle	a	deal	with	Adani	can	be	attributed	to	a	variety	of	factors.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	and	Adani	had	misaligned	expectations	in	relation	to	the	status	and	schedule	of	negotiations.	As	a	result,	Adani	sought	authorisation	from	a	third	party	to	meet	its	deadline	and	this	was	perceived	as	an	attempt	to	undermine	the	authority	of	the	applicants.	The	applicants	were	ultimately	dissatisfied	with	the	deal	on	offer,	as	the	terms	of	agreement	were	not	sensitive	to	key	Indigenous	interests	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).			
Unaligned	Expectations	
The	first	phase	of	negotiations	began	in	May	2011,	prior	to	the	official	notification	date	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	in	November	2011.	Negotiations	were	conducted	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	for	24	months,	ending	in	December	2012.	While	it	appears	that	negotiations	remained	on-track	for	the	majority	of	this	period,	the	applicants	submitted	a	number	of	contentions	to	the	NNTT	in	relation	to	their	engagement	with	Adani	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		Adani’s	delayed	response	to	the	applicants’	initial	position	paper	was	raised	as	a	concern.	The	response	letter	received	after	a	seven-month	delay	included	an	increased	geographical	scope	of	consent,	an	expansion	the	applicants	would	have	to	consider	at	length	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	While	the	applicants’	position	paper	had	been	based	on	the	surrender	of	2,700	hectares	of	native	title,	this	area	had	expanded	to	5,060	hectares	in	Adani’s	response	letter.	The	company	had	also	set	the	deadline	to	conclude	negotiations	in	early	October	2012,	expecting	the	applicants	to	revise	their	position	in	less	than	three	months	and	consent	to	the	deal	on	offer.	While	the	
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applicants	accepted	the	expanded	surrender	of	their	native	title	rights	in	the	revised	proposal,	they	felt	under	pressure	to	consent	to	the	agreement	within	Adani’s	devised	timeframe	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	While	the	applicants	had	aimed	to	meet	the	agreement	schedule,	“they	did	not	agree	to	be	committed	to	the	grantee	party’s	timeframes”	(Adani	Mining	v.	
Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013,	p.	30),	nor	did	they	“give	an	unqualified	assurance	that	they	would	[meet	the	grantee	party’s	requirements]”	(p.	37).	At	a	meeting	in	late	September	2012,	the	applicants’	felt	that	the	close	deadline	was	‘forcing	their	hand’	and	Adani	had	‘pushed	hard’	to	have	the	ILUA	signed	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		Earlier	in	September	2012,	a	month	before	Adani	expected	the	agreement	to	be	authorised,	the	applicants	changed	legal	representation	(Adani	Mining	v.	
Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	This	decision	highlighted	the	applicants’	concern	for	their	interests,	as	the	change	occurred	when	Adani	had	expanded	the	scope	of	consents.	Some	of	the	applicants	expressed	dissatisfaction	with	the	direction	that	negotiations	were	travelling	in	under	the	guidance	of	the	former	legal	advisors	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	The	change	also	demonstrated	the	applicants’	intention	to	continue	negotiations	and	develop	a	stronger	agreement.	However,	it	was	unlikely	that	a	better	deal	could	be	negotiated	in	time	to	meet	Adani’s	deadline.		Adani’s	realisation	that	the	applicants	wished	to	prolong	negotiations	in	order	to	settle	an	improved	ILUA	created	a	rift	between	the	two	parties.	Adani’s	conduct	became	rigid	and	unwilling	to	consider	additional	terms	of	agreement.	In	a	letter	and	teleconference,	the	applicants’	legal	representative	Chalk	&	Fitzgerald	proposed	a	life	of	mine	services	contract	be	included	in	the	agreement	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	A	life	of	mine	services	contract	would	involve	the	partnership	of	Transfield	Services	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	to	provide	the	service	and	maintenance	of	the	Carmichael	Project	camps.	The	contract	would	provide	long-term	benefits	for	the	community,	generating	employment	opportunities	and	business	ownership.	If	the	services	contract	were	included,	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	were	willing	to	accept	the	settlement	deal.	However,	Adani	contended	that	it	would	not	include	a	life	of	mine	services	contract	in	the	ILUA	and	
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viewed	the	proposal	as	an	attempt	to	reset	the	path	of	negotiations	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		While	Adani	was	adamant	that	the	applicants	were	committed	to	the	agreement	schedule	and	would	sign	the	ILUA	in	October	2012,	it	appears	both	parties’	perception	of	the	stage	reached	in	negotiations	had	become	increasingly	unaligned.	The	applicants	were	unwilling	to	give	their	consent	to	the	existing	terms	of	agreement	in	Adani’s	best	settlement	offer	(Adani	Mining	
v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	As	they	were	dissatisfied	with	the	direction	of	negotiations,	the	applicants	changed	legal	representatives	with	the	hope	that	it	would	assist	them	to	negotiate	a	stronger	agreement.	When	Adani’s	agreement	schedule	started	to	elapse,	the	applicants	attempted	to	negotiate	a	better	deal	for	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	through	the	inclusion	of	a	life	of	mine	services	contract	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	However,	their	efforts	were	unsuccessful	as	Adani	was	unwilling	to	accommodate	the	contract	or	extend	negotiations.	The	solution	for	Adani	was	simple,	to	approach	the	State	for	its	mining	grants	and	avoid	further	delay.		
Undermining	Authority		
When	the	likelihood	of	having	an	agreement	signed	in	October	2012	began	to	diminish,	Adani	sought	authorisation	from	a	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	affiliate	that	had	no	previous	involvement	in	negotiations.	This	occurred	at	the	end	of	2012,	after	Adani	had	filed	a	future	act	determination	for	its	mining	lease	but	the	case	was	still	awaiting	submissions	by	all	parties.				In	December	2012,	Adani	attempted	to	sideline	the	authority	of	the	applicants	and	seek	authorisation	from	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	Traditional	Owners	Aboriginal	Corporation	(WJ	Corporation).	The	WJ	Corporation	is	a	representative	body	with	a	board	of	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	family	representatives	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	While	its	membership	is	comprised	of	many	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claimants,	it	also	represents	people	who	are	not	claimants.	Patrick	Malone	told	the	NNTT	that	the	membership	of	the	WJ	Corporation	included	‘large	numbers’	of	people	who	were	not	descendants	of	the	12	families	that	constitute	the	claim	group	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		
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The	function	of	the	WJ	Corporation	is	seldom	mentioned	in	the	available	evidence,	so	it	is	difficult	to	distinguish	the	difference	between	the	WJ	Corporation	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	Family	Council	(WJ	Family	Council).	The	role	of	the	WJ	Family	Council	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.	According	to	the	affidavits	of	the	native	title	applicants	in	Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others	(2013),	the	WJ	Corporation	shared	different	views	to	the	applicants	and	cannot	be	considered	fully	representative	of	the	claim	group.		Following	Chalk	&	Fitzgerald’s	proposal	for	a	life	of	mine	services	contract,	Adani	made	a	final	effort	to	have	its	proposed	ILUA	signed.	In	November	2012,	Adani	effectively	sidestepped	the	applicants	and	began	correspondence	with	the	WJ	Corporation	and	their	legal	representatives	Just	Us	Lawyers	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	Adani	convened	a	meeting	in	collaboration	with	the	WJ	Corporation	on	1	December	2012	in	an	attempt	to	have	the	agreement	authorised	by	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	While	the	NNTT	deemed	this	approach	as	‘opportunistic’,	the	applicants	felt	Adani’s	conduct	undermined	their	authority	and	exacerbated	divisions	within	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	It	was	also	stated	that	the	WJ	Corporation	represented	people	who	were	not	registered	claimants	and	some	members	were	seeking	to	unseat	the	applicants.	These	concerns	were	expressed	in	several	letters	to	Adani	sent	in	mid-November	2012.	Despite	this,	the	authorisation	meeting	was	not	cancelled	and	a	resolution	was	passed	on	the	day.	However,	the	resolution	rejected	the	ILUA	on	offer	and	recommended	additional	terms	to	be	included	in	the	agreement	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		Adani	continued	to	communicate	directly	with	the	WJ	Corporation	while	it	was	aware	of	a	dispute	between	the	applicants	and	the	WJ	Corporation	board	members.	The	applicants	are	entrusted	with	the	responsibility	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	claim	group	during	negotiations	(Duff,	2017;	NNTT,	2017).	While	Adani’s	actions	were	not	considered	illegal,	its	decision	to	suspend	negotiations	with	the	applicants	and	seek	authorisation	from	a	group	it	deemed	as	equally	representative	of	the	claim	group	undermined	the	role	of	the	applicants	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	
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While	some	registered	claimants	would	have	attended	the	1	December	2012	meeting,	and	the	applicant	Patrick	Malone	moved	the	motion	to	adopt	the	resolution	on	the	day,	the	conduct	of	Adani	highlights	its	unwillingness	to	compromise	on	its	final	settlement	deal	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	Adani	placed	the	applicants	in	a	challenging	position,	whereby	an	unauthorised	representative	body	was	delegated	influence	during	a	pivotal	stage	of	negotiations.	This	occurred	without	the	support	of	the	applicants.	It	appears	that	Adani’s	decision	to	give	power	to	a	third	party	was	done	with	the	intention	that	the	meeting	attendees	would	settle	for	the	ILUA	on	offer.			
An	Unsatisfactory	Agreement	
Both	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	present	a	number	of	conflicting	claims	about	the	circumstances	that	led	to	the	collapse	of	negotiations.	It	is	unclear	whether	disagreements	can	be	ascribed	to	miscommunication	or	deliberate	misinformation.	However,	what	becomes	clear	is	that	the	applicants	were	not	satisfied	with	the	terms	of	agreement.	The	applicants	stated	in	a	letter	to	Adani	that	without	a	life	of	mine	services	contract	the	compensation	aspect	of	the	ILUA	would	be	“wholly	deficient”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013,	p.	89).	In	a	letter	sent	in	mid-October	to	Adani,	the	applicants	contended	that,	“the	compensation	put	forward	in	Adani’s	offer	of	24	September	2012	for	a	mine	of	this	scale	and	impact	would	otherwise	be	seriously	inadequate”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	
&	Others,	2013,	p.	73).	The	life	of	mine	services	contract	was	proposed	in	the	letter	and	indicated	that	with	the	contract	ensured,	the	ILUA	would	be	acceptable.	However,	Adani	was	unwilling	to	negotiate	a	services	contract	with	the	applicants	and	sought	authorisation	elsewhere	before	turning	to	the	State	for	approval.		In	the	process	of	negotiating	agreements	with	government	and	developers,	Indigenous	communities	wish	to	attain	a	‘better	life’	in	both	an	economic	and	cultural	sense	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).	Some	future	acts	can	produce	short-	and	long-term	opportunities	for	locals	and	some	Indigenous	people	strongly	support	mining	developments	(Behrendt	&	Strelein,	2001;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).	However,	the	cumulative	effects	caused	by	mining	can	be	damaging	to	land	and	culture.	Many	native	title	groups	attempt	to	strike	a	balance	between	
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the	material	and	cultural	benefits	of	development	projects.	While	financial	gain	may	be	beneficial	for	under-resourced	communities,	it	may	not	be	the	goal	that	agreements	are	signed	at	the	detriment	of	connection	to	country	and	culture	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).	The	terms	of	agreement	must	therefore	contain	adequate	benefits	to	justify	the	impact	of	developments	on	traditional	land.		In	this	case,	the	applicants	were	dissatisfied	with	the	ILUA	put	forward	and	required	more	time	to	negotiate	a	stronger	agreement.	However,	they	were	unable	to	strike	a	deal	they	felt	compensated	for	the	surrender	of	native	title.	Adani,	unwilling	to	extend	their	timeframe,	opted	to	have	the	State	grant	their	mining	lease	without	Indigenous	consent.			
An	Emerging	Pattern	
The	first	phase	of	negotiations	reflect	the	complexities	observed	in	similar	case	studies.	The	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	is	a	large-scale	development	that	has	placed	Australia’s	native	title	system	under	scrutiny	and	tested	its	capacity	to	protect	Indigenous	rights	and	interests.	Large	resource	projects	often	become	problematic	when	they	encounter	native	title	for	a	number	of	reasons.		When	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	refused	to	sign	a	deal	with	Adani,	the	company	ensured	that	the	failure	to	obtain	consent	did	not	cause	further	delay	and	approached	the	NNTT.	The	involvement	of	the	State	had	desirable	outcomes	for	Adani.	As	its	schedule	began	to	elapse,	Adani	threatened	to	arbitrate	the	matter	if	the	agreement	was	not	signed.	In	a	letter	to	the	applicants	a	few	days	before	the	deadline,	Adani	indicated	it	would	file	a	future	act	determination	application	with	the	NNTT	if	the	applicants’	change	of	lawyers	were	to	delay	its	schedule.	The	letter	exchanged	between	the	legal	representatives	of	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	stated,	“If	the	ILUA	were	to	be	authorised	on	1	December	2012,	the	grantee	party	would	consider	discontinuing	its	future	act	determination	application”	(Adani	Mining	
v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013,	p.	22).	This	communication	put	the	applicants	under	pressure	to	accept	the	agreement	or	have	the	State	Government	compulsorily	acquire	their	land.	The	literature	has	observed	that	the	State	consistently	rules	in	favour	of	mining	interests	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Ritter,	
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2009;	Scambary,	2013).	This	is	reflected	in	the	NNTT’s	decision	to	approve	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	when	Adani	sought	a	future	act	determination.		The	Federal	Government	has	increasingly	tasked	developers	with	the	role	of	funding	negotiations	(Burnside,	2008;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Scambary,	2013;	Ritter,	2009).	This	presents	a	conflict	of	interest	for	resource	companies,	as	it	reduces	the	impartiality	of	the	future	act	process	and	can	undermine	the	bargaining	position	of	Indigenous	groups	(Scambary,	2013;	Ritter,	2009).	The	heads	of	development	projects	control	the	funds	distributed	in	the	course	of	negotiations	and	can	refuse	to	provide	certain	advisors	or	even	choose	to	suspend	funding.	The	role	can	be	used	strategically	to	pressure	Indigenous	groups	into	accepting	weak	agreements	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Scambary,	2013).		Adani	met	the	costs	of	negotiations	with	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	Funding	primarily	included	travel	costs	for	meetings	and	paid	legal	advice	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013;	Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	
Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	In	the	first	phase	of	negotiations,	Adani	threatened	to	deny	the	applicants	funding	for	new	legal	advisors.	Adani	expressed	discontent	over	the	applicants’	decision	to	change	lawyers	in	September	2012	and	stated	that	it	was	“unlikely	to	agree	to	extra	costs	of	funding	legal	representation”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013,	p.	55).	The	company	subsequently	agreed	to	fund	meetings	between	the	applicants	and	their	new	lawyers	on	the	condition	that	an	agreement	would	be	reached	by	the	devised	deadline.	This	reflects	the	conduct	of	developers	observed	in	the	literature,	whereby	control	over	funds	leads	to	the	tendency	to	set	conditions	and	withhold	funding	if	an	Indigenous	group	seeks	to	extend	or	alter	negotiations	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Scambary,	2013)	While	Adani	denied	that	it	exacerbated	divisions	by	involving	the	WJ	Corporation	in	negotiations,	the	applicants	remained	adamant	that	it	would	perpetuate	conflict	within	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).	Adani’s	collaboration	with	a	separate	representative	body	effectively	took	power	and	authority	away	from	the	individuals	voted	in	to	speak	on	behalf	on	the	claim	group.	While	the	company	acknowledged	its	awareness	of	division	in	the	community,	it	still	acted	to	further	its	own	interests.		
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It	is	clear	from	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	that	while	Indigenous	rights	exist,	they	can	be	undermined	when	required	to	compete	with	the	power	of	mining	interests.	When	collective	rights,	such	as	the	right	to	negotiate	(RTN),	fail	to	produce	desirable	outcomes	for	mining	interests,	the	overriding	powers	of	government	are	sought	to	remedy	obstacles	to	development.	As	outlined	in	the	theories	of	Kymlicka	and	Buchanan,	the	rights	afforded	under	the	NTA	have	fulfilled	the	mandate	of	collective	rights.	However,	examining	the	tangible	outcomes	of	these	rights	exposes	the	severe	limitations	of	the	process.	Critical	race	theory	(CRT)	would	postulate	that	the	dominance	of	‘white’	interests,	which	prioritise	mining	interests	in	the	Australian	context,	undermines	Indigenous	land	rights.										
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Chapter	4	
The	First	Determination	
Adani	has	sought	a	future	act	determination	on	two	occasions.	The	company	approached	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT)	to	have	its	three	mining	leases	approved,	but	not	to	arbitrate	an	Indigenous	Land	Use	Agreement	(ILUA).	Thus,	negotiations	continued	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	applicants	despite	two	determination	outcomes	that	ruled	in	favour	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine.	The	first	future	act	determination	in	May	2013	concerned	one	initial	mining	lease,	and	the	second	determination	in	April	2015	concerned	two	further	mining	leases.	This	chapter	will	focus	on	the	May	2013	determination	and	the	division	within	the	claim	group	that	occurred	thereafter.			When	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	had	exceeded	Adani’s	deadline	with	no	agreement	outcome,	the	company	filed	a	future	act	determination	application	with	the	NNTT	on	7	November	2012.	Seven	months	later,	on	7	May	2013,	the	NNTT	delivered	its	determination	in	favour	of	the	mining	lease	(ML)	70441.	The	decision	gave	the	State	Government	a	green	flag	to	approve	the	tenement	required	to	commence	development	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine.	Adani	and	the	State	Government	sought	a	ruling	that	the	future	act	may	be	done	without	conditions.	It	appears	that	both	parties	acted	in	tandem,	routinely	echoing	the	same	perspectives	in	their	submissions	to	the	NNTT.	The	NNTT	ruled	that	the	mining	lease	could	be	granted	on	the	basis	of	public	interest.			The	Native	Title	Act	(NTA)	permits	any	party	to	seek	arbitration	if	negotiations	exceed	six	months	without	a	settlement	reached.	Any	party	may	file	a	future	act	determination	application	at	the	NNTT	(NNTT,	2008a,	2016;	NTSCORP,	2017).	In	making	a	future	act	determination,	the	NNTT	must	interpret	sections	of	the	NTA	to	determine	whether	a	future	act	may	or	may	not	be	done	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Ritter,	2009).	The	process	involves	three	parties:	the	native	title	applicants,	the	State	Government,	and	the	grantee	party.	All	parties	are	asked	to	make	submissions	of	any	contentions	or	evidence	to	the	NNTT	to	assist	its	determination.	If	the	NNTT	rules	in	favour	of	the	proposed	future	act,	the	government	has	permission	to	grant	tenement	in	
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the	absence	of	an	agreement	reached	between	the	grantee	and	the	traditional	owners	(NNTT,	2008a).		In	its	May	2013	determination,	the	NNTT	concluded	that	the	applicants	did	not	submit	sufficient	evidence	to	demonstrate	the	exercise	or	enjoyment	of	their	rights	and	interests	in	the	claim	area	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	
Others,	2013).	The	NNTT	ruled	that	the	applicants’	submissions	provided	broad	assertions	of	an	impact	on	their	rights	and	interests	but	offered	no	specific	evidence	about	how	these	rights	and	interests	were	exercised	or	enjoyed.	The	State	Government	and	Adani	both	claimed	that	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	would	be	unlikely	to	affect	the	native	title	group’s	enjoyment	of	their	rights	and	interests.	The	State	Government	and	Adani	repeatedly	emphasised	the	economic	benefits	of	the	Carmichael	Project	for	the	local	community,	the	State	of	Queensland	and	the	wider	national	economy	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		The	applicants	requested	that	conditions	be	attached	to	the	mining	lease	should	the	NNTT	determine	that	the	future	act	may	be	done.	The	NNTT	dismissed	the	recommended	conditions	and	handed	down	its	determination	on	7	May	2013,	ruling	that	the	State	Government	may	grant	ML	70441	without	conditions	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013).		The	State	Government	and	Adani’s	response	has	been	based	on	their	views	expressed	in	the	NNTT’s	determination.	However,	it	must	be	appreciated	that	the	full	submissions	to	the	NNTT	are	not	publicly	available.	The	evidence	relies	on	the	NNTT’s	interpretation	of	those	submissions.	Nevertheless,	the	State	Government	and	Adani	reflected	similar	positions,	emphasising	the	same	benefits	of	the	project	and	arguing	that	the	rights	and	interests	of	the	applicants	would	not	be	affected.	These	views	persist	despite	the	applicants’	claim	that	there	would	be	a	significant	impact	on	the	enjoyment	of	their	rights	and	interests	as	a	consequence	of	the	development	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	
Diver	&	Others,	2013).	While	there	was	no	media	commentary	or	parliamentary	debate	on	the	outcome	of	the	May	2013	determination,	a	significant	event	occurred	at	the	peak	of	negotiations.	This	event	demonstrated	the	close	relations	of	the	State	Government	and	Adani.	In	late	November	2012,	the	then	Queensland	Premier,	Campbell	Newman,	led	a	seven-day	trade	mission	to	India	to	discuss	
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investment	and	exporting	prospects	for	Queensland’s	industries	(Hodge,	2012;	Queensland	Government,	2012;	Readfearn,	2015).	Newman	highlighted	that	the	overseas	mission	would,	“include	meetings	with	companies	such	as	Adani	Group,	GVK	and	Tata	Group	–	companies	with	diversified	interests	and	investments	across	a	range	of	key	industry	sectors”	(Queensland	Parliament.	Record	of	Proceedings,	November	9,	2012,	p.	2955).		Newman,	former	Minister	for	Resources	and	Energy	Martin	Ferguson	and	a	76-person	cohort	of	Queensland	businessmen	flew	to	the	Adani-owned	Mundra	Port	on	a	private	Adani	jet.	In	the	evening,	they	attended	a	reception	at	the	private	estate	of	Gautam	Adani	in	Ahmedabad	(Hodge,	2012;	Readfearn,	2015).	In	a	report	on	the	trade	mission	tabled	to	the	Queensland	Parliament,	Newman	reiterated	his	support	for	Adani:	“I	acknowledge	the	large	investment	made	by	the	Adani	Group	into	Queensland’s	resources	sectors	and	indicated	commitment	to	working	with	the	Adani	Group	to	ensure	their	investment	in	Queensland	is	supported”	(Newman,	2013,	p.	29).		During	the	trade	mission	the	Queensland	Government	made	a	clear	commitment	to	support	Adani,	while	in	the	same	month	the	company	had	acted	to	sidestep	the	traditional	owners	of	the	Galilee	Basin.	The	response	of	the	State	Government	and	Adani	before	the	NNTT	reflect	a	cohesive	and	shared	ambition	to	ensure	the	Carmichael	Project	proceeded.	The	State	Government	appeared	unaware	or	unsupportive	of	the	concerns	raised	by	the	native	title	group.			
The	Split	in	the	Community	
The	second	phase	of	negotiations	commenced	in	October	2013	and	ended	in	October	2014.	As	negotiations	failed	to	produce	an	agreement	between	Adani	and	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	after	12	months,	Adani	approached	the	State	to	arbitrate	the	matter	for	a	second	time.	In	this	respect,	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	had	similar	results	to	the	first.	However,	during	this	period	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	became	deeply	divided	and	split	into	two	factions.	One	supported	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	if	the	agreement	was	sensitive	to	Indigenous	interests,	whereas	the	other	was	opposed	to	the	project	and	any	deal	offered.	While	the	native	title	system	
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disenfranchised	the	interests	of	the	latter	group,	the	former	still	had	the	capacity	to	strike	a	strong	bargaining	position	and	negotiate	a	mutually	beneficial	agreement.	There	is	evidence	to	indicate	that	internal	division	contributed	to	the	unresolved	outcome	of	the	second	phase	of	negotiations.		This	analysis	largely	relies	on	the	determinations	of	the	NNTT	and	its	account	of	events	and	correspondence	relevant	to	its	decisions.	The	second	half	of	this	chapter	analyses	the	evidence	provided	in	Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	
&	Others	(2015),	a	46-page	legal	document.	When	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	ended	in	October	2014,	Adani	filed	a	future	act	determination	application	with	the	NNTT.	In	this	determination,	the	applicants	chose	not	to	make	a	submission.	In	the	absence	of	any	materials	or	contentions	submitted	to	the	NNTT	on	behalf	of	the	native	title	group,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	factors	that	led	to	the	collapse	of	negotiations	in	this	second	phase.	In	contrast	to	the	previous	future	act	determination	wherein	the	applicants	detailed	their	experience	during	the	first	phase	of	negotiations,	the	second	phase	lacks	the	evidence	to	form	a	chronological	account	of	what	occurred.	As	the	NNTT	asserted	in	relation	to	the	second	phase:	“Within	the	evidence	there	is	minimal	information	about	ILUA	negotiations”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	
Others,	2015,	p.	45).		While	there	is	less	evidence	available	to	detail	the	second	phase	of	negotiations,	it	is	clear	that	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	were	dissatisfied	with	the	terms	of	agreement.	At	a	claim	group	meeting	in	October	2014,	the	proposed	ILUA	was	rejected	by	majority	vote.	This	marked	the	second	agreement	to	be	refused	and	Adani	immediately	sought	arbitration	to	have	ML	70505	and	ML	70506	approved	without	Indigenous	consent	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).			
A	Change	of	Representation	
While	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	appeared	to	resemble	a	united	bloc	during	the	first	phase	negotiations,	a	clear	division	emerged	in	the	course	of	the	second	phase.	On	7	August	2014,	the	seven	persons	registered	as	the	native	title	applicants	for	the	claim	group	were	replaced	with	three	applicants,	two	of	whom	were	existing	applicants.	Five	applicants	were	not	re-appointed	
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(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	While	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	had	been	representatives	for	the	group	since	the	beginning	of	negotiations,	Adrian	Burragubba	was	appointed	as	a	new	applicant.	It	appears	a	distinct	division	of	opinion	within	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	coincided	with	the	change	of	representatives.		The	dominant	perspective	of	the	claim	group	in	the	first	phase	of	negotiations	was	a	willingness	to	accept	the	Carmichael	Project	and	surrender	native	title	if	a	satisfactory	agreement	could	be	reached.	However,	a	separate	faction	emerged	with	the	appointment	of	Adrian	Burragubba	in	August	2014.	This	‘breakaway’	group	was	unwilling	to	give	consent	to	the	project	regardless	of	the	conditions,	compensation	or	benefits	included	in	the	ILUA.	Adrian	Burragubba,	as	a	new	applicant	and	founder	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	Family	Council	(WJ	Family	Council),	represented	the	views	of	the	latter	faction.	The	WJ	Family	Council	is	a	community	group	that	claims	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	(Hunjan,	2015;	Yoon,	2015).	It	has	been	described	as	an	anti-mine	group	that	seeks	to	conserve	and	protect	the	land	of	the	traditional	owners	in	central	Queensland	(Ker,	2016).	The	WJ	Family	Council	remains	adamant	that	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	do	not	want	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	to	proceed	on	any	terms.	In	a	media	release,	Adrian	Burragubba	stated	the	position	of	the	WJ	Family	Council:		A	pittance	from	compensation	agreements	signed	under	duress,	and	a	few	minimum-wage	jobs	in	a	dying	industry,	are	not	what	our	people,	especially	our	young	people,	deserve.	The	crumbs	thrown	by	Adani	are	not	worth	sacrificing	our	dignity,	our	freedom	and	our	ancient	legacy	for.	Nothing	Adani	offers	up	will	ever	be	worth	the	damage	this	mine	will	inflict	on	laws	and	customs.	(WJ	Family	Council,	2016d,	para.	14)	In	contrast	to	the	anti-mine	rhetoric	of	Adrian	Burragubba	and	his	cohort,	the	views	of	the	other	applicants,	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White,	remained	consistent	with	the	stance	adopted	during	the	first	phase	of	negotiations.	This	position	accepted	the	establishment	of	the	mine	on	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	land	but	aimed	to	negotiate	terms	of	agreement	that	would	return	long-term	intergenerational	benefits	to	the	community.	Aligned	with	the	perspective	that	
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they	were	working	towards	an	agreement	with	Adani,	these	applicants	chose	to	withhold	consent	until	the	ILUA	offered	satisfactory	benefits.		Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	do	not	appear	to	be	associated	with	any	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	organisation	in	particular,	but	instead	represent	the	interests	of	the	claim	group	independently.	They	are	not	board	members	of	the	WJ	Council	nor	is	there	any	evidence	of	their	involvement	at	the	WJ	Corporation.	In	consideration	of	the	dispute	between	the	applicants	and	the	WJ	Corporation	in	the	first	phase	of	negotiations,	it	can	be	assumed	that	the	applicants	continue	to	operate	independently	of	the	WJ	Corporation	and	any	other	WJ-affiliated	organisations.		It	is	common	for	members	of	Indigenous	groups	to	share	different	views	on	commercial	development	and	cultural	heritage.	While	some	may	consider	the	opportunity	for	local	jobs	and	business	ownership	as	paramount,	others	may	consider	the	conservation	of	traditional	lands	and	sacred	sites	to	be	more	important	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2007).	The	divide	that	emerged	in	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	may	reflect	the	different	values	each	individual	claimant	has	attached	to	economic	growth	and	culture	heritage.	The	faction	that	accepted	the	development	of	the	mine	was	willing	to	surrender	part	of	their	ancestral	lands	in	exchange	for	long-term	economic	benefits	for	the	community.	The	anti-mine	faction,	however,	considered	the	protection	of	traditional	land	and	culture	more	important	than	any	compensation	offered.		The	discourse	of	the	anti-mine	faction	emphasised	the	imminent	threat	of	the	development	to	the	culture	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	In	October	2015,	WJ	Family	Council	members	Adrian	Burragubba	and	Murrawah	Johnson	made	a	submission	to	the	United	Nations	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	in	a	plea	to	have	their	concerns	recognised.	The	submission	described	the	intrinsic	link	between	land	and	culture	for	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people:	Our	land	and	waters	are	our	culture,	and	our	special	relationship	with	them	tells	us	who	we	are.	Our	culture	is	inseparable	from	the	condition	of	our	traditional	lands…	The	development	of	the	Carmichael	Mine	would	tear	the	heart	out	of	our	country,	rendering	our	land	unrecognisable,	and	devastating	the	places,	animals,	plants	
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and	water-bodies	that	are	so	essential	to	us	and	our	culture.	(Burragubba	&	Johnson,	2015,	p.	2)	
	
A	Rift	Between	the	Applicants	
The	divided	opinion	between	the	applicants	became	evident	in	their	conduct	before	the	NNTT.	This	occurred	after	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	had	elapsed	without	an	outcome.	In	January	2015,	the	NNTT	was	informed	that	the	applicants	would	not	be	submitting	any	material	or	contentions	to	support	their	case	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	However,	several	days	following	the	deadline	for	submissions,	Adrian	Burragubba	sent	an	unsigned	statement	written	on	behalf	of	the	WJ	Family	Council.	The	statement	addressed	concerns	in	relation	to	the	impact	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	on	the	traditional	land	and	cultural	heritage	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	Adrian	Burragubba	alleged	that	the	applicants’	views	were	not	unanimous	and	that	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	had	taken	a	‘contrary	direction’	to	the	interests	of	the	claim	group.	When	the	NNTT	asked	if	his	statement	should	be	taken	into	account,	the	applicants,	Adani,	and	the	State	Government	all	agreed	that	it	should	not	be	considered	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015;	Kos,	2016).	Adrian	Burragubba’s	submission	to	the	NNTT	has	not	been	made	publicly	available	and	has	been	broadly	summarised	in	its	determination.	The	summary	noted	that	his	submission	detailed	the	reasons	the	applicants	could	not	participate	in	the	proceedings	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	
Others,	2015).	In	its	determination,	the	NNTT	did	provide	the	full	version	of	a	second	statement	made	by	Adrian	Burragubba.	This	second	statement	clarified	his	argument	and	reinforced	that	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	do	not	consent	to	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	
Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).			
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A	Sense	of	Practicality	or	Obligation	
While	Adrian	Burragubba	and	his	supporters	were	dedicated	to	opposing	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	regardless	of	the	deal	offered,	the	applicants	and	claimants	that	reflected	a	willingness	to	accommodate	the	project	may	have	formed	their	perspective	with	awareness	to	the	limitations	of	native	title.	At	best,	when	an	Indigenous	group	refuses	to	give	consent,	the	company’s	social	license	to	operate	may	be	blemished	in	the	eyes	of	investors	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2011;	Robertson,	2016b;	Scambary,	2013).	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claimants	who	do	not	support	the	Carmichael	Project	on	any	terms	are	left	without	a	legislative	foothold.	The	State	had	continued	to	issue	approvals	despite	the	failure	to	obtain	consent	up	until	that	point.		Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	may	have	acted	out	of	practicality,	as	they	understand	the	existing	legislation	does	not	enable	them	to	prevent	the	mine	but	that	the	community	could	attain	benefits	if	a	strong	agreement	was	reached.	In	a	news	article,	Patrick	Malone	stated	that,	“even	though	some	[Wangan	and	Jagalingou]	people	didn’t	like	the	idea	of	the	mine,	most	knew	it	would	probably	go	ahead	and	it	was	best	to	take	the	opportunities	for	our	people,	to	get	jobs	for	the	next	generations”	(McKenna,	2015).	This	statement	acknowledged	the	perspective	shared	among	claimants	who	recognise	the	limitations	of	the	native	title	system	and	the	inevitability	of	mining	expansion.			Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	have	spoken	favourably	about	signing	an	agreement	with	Adani	on	the	basis	that	it	delivers	long-term	intergenerational	opportunities	that	will	flow	back	to	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community	(Branco,	2015a;	McKenna,	2015).	However,	there	have	been	several	occasions	where	the	media	has	reported	divergent	views.	While	Irene	White	has	remained	a	proponent	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine,	Patrick	Malone	has	expressed	a	reluctance	to	accept	the	mine.	The	three	applicants	appointed	in	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	reflected	far	greater	inconsistency	in	their	sentiments	towards	the	development	compared	to	those	in	the	first	appointment.	At	one	end	of	the	spectrum,	Irene	White	remained	pro-mine	while	Patrick	Malone	was	initially	conflicted	and	then	accepted	the	inevitability	of	the	mine.	At	the	other	end,	Adrian	Burragubba	was	strongly	anti-mine.	Irene	White	expressed	her	views	on	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	to	
The	Australian	on	3	December	2015,	arguing	that	“The	decision	is	about	
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working	with	Adani	to	create	jobs,	create	training	so	that	we	can	build	a	platform	for	our	younger	generation”	and	that	the	agreement	would	“deliver	genuine	and	lasting	intergenerational	benefits	to	our	community“	(McKenna,	2015).	Patrick	Malone	has	spoken	both	for	and	against	the	mine.	While	he	has	admitted	that	he	would	“prefer	the	mine	to	not	go	ahead”,	he	has	also	told	media	he	had	accepted	that	the	project	would	be	approved	and	he	was	committed	to	achieving	the	best	deal	for	his	community	(Branco,	2015,	para.	8).		The	corporate	funding	of	negotiations	may	be	a	factor	that	has	caused	those	applicants	engaged	in	negotiations	for	a	longer	period	to	feel	more	obligated	to	match	the	expectations	of	Adani.	Responsible	for	funding	negotiations,	Adani	has	paid	the	travel	costs	of	the	applicants	for	meetings	and	lobbied	some	of	the	applicants	through	the	payment	of	generous	‘sitting	fees’.	Sitting	fees	have	been	paid	to	a	number	of	the	applicants.	On	21	August	2015,	nine	new	applicants	were	appointed	and	Patrick	Malone,	Irene	White	and	Adrian	Burragubba	were	re-appointed	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).		According	to	The	Guardian,	Adani	paid	seven	of	the	12	applicants,	including	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White,	over	$10,500	collectively	in	excess	of	travel	expenses	to	attend	meetings	(Robertson,	2016,	2016b;	WJ	Family	Council,	2016).	The	seven	applicants	that	received	sitting	fees	were	proponents	of	the	Carmichael	Project.	The	five	other	applicants	were	opposed	to	the	development	and	refused	to	accept	payments	(Robertson,	2016b).	For	some	applicants	who	may	have	had	more	accommodating	views	towards	the	mine,	receiving	payments	to	attend	meetings	may	have	conjured	a	sense	of	obligation.	The	literature	strongly	supports	the	argument	that	the	developer’s	responsibility	to	fund	negotiations	creates	an	uneven	power	dynamic	that	can	considerably	influence	agreement	outcomes	(Burnside,	2008;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Scambary,	2013;	Ritter,	2009).	It	appears	that	the	rise	of	an	anti-mine	faction	within	the	claim	group	thwarted	the	outcome	of	negotiations	in	the	second	phase.	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White	explained	to	the	media	that	Adani	had	improved	the	terms	of	agreement	and	the	revised	ILUA	had	gained	widespread	support.	However,	there	was	a	shift	following	the	appointment	of	Adrian	Burragubba	and	
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support	for	the	offer	diminished.	When	the	group	met	to	consider	the	agreement	in	October	2014,	the	growing	anti-mine	sentiments	caused	it	to	be	voted	down	(McKenna,	2015).	It	is	likely	that	divided	opinion	during	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	contributed	to	the	unresolved	outcome.	Following	the	second	rejection	of	the	ILUA,	Adani	ended	negotiations	and	lodged	a	future	act	determination	application	with	the	NNTT	on	10	October	2014	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).		It	is	clear	that	the	process	of	negotiation	and	the	limitations	of	the	NTA	left	the	Indigenous	community	vulnerable	to	fracturing	and	division,	further	undermining	their	interests.	When	the	right	to	negotiate	(RTN)	fails	to	operate	as	intended	and	traditional	owners	refuse	to	consent	to	a	development,	these	rights	can	effectively	be	nullified	through	the	right	of	all	parties	to	arbitrate	the	matter.	This	chapter	has	examined	the	avenue	of	arbitration,	whereby	Adani	has	sought	the	overarching	powers	of	the	State	to	advance	approvals	in	the	absence	of	Indigenous	consent.	The	strength	of	the	RTN	is	subject	to	the	decisions	of	mining	interests	and	the	State	who	may	seek	to	override	the	interests	of	traditional	owners.	If	an	agreement	fails	actualise,	the	RTN	becomes	a	redundant	right.		The	outcome	of	this	process	demonstrates	that	the	NTA	does	not	allow	traditional	owners	to	fully	assert	collective	rights,	as	conceptualised	in	the	theories	of	Kymlicka	and	Buchanan.	The	weaknesses	of	the	rights	afforded	by	native	title	reflect	the	arguments	inherent	in	critical	race	theory	(CRT).	CRT	would	argue	that	the	apparatus	of	native	title	law	has	ensured	that	it	offers	almost	no	legislative	foothold	for	Indigenous	groups	who	oppose	‘white’	interests	in	resource	development.	Thus,	the	dominant	interests	of	‘whites’	will	always	supersede	the	rights	and	interests	of	native	title	groups.			
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Chapter	5	
Back	to	the	Tribunal	
When	the	second	phase	of	negotiations	failed	to	produce	an	Indigenous	Land	Use	Agreement	(ILUA),	Adani	sought	arbitration	for	two	further	mining	leases.	If	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT)	ruled	that	the	future	act	may	be	done,	the	government	would	be	able	to	grant	the	mining	leases	in	the	absence	of	an	ILUA	signed	with	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	Adani	filed	its	second	future	act	determination	for	the	additional	mining	leases	(ML)	70505	and	70506	in	October	2014.	The	NNTT	delivered	its	determination	in	favour	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	on	8	April	2015	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	
Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).		As	examined	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	native	title	applicants	chose	not	to	make	a	submission	to	the	NNTT	for	this	determination	with	the	exception	of	Adrian	Burragubba’s	two	statements	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	
Others,	2015).	In	consideration	of	his	statements,	the	State	Government	and	the	NNTT	both	raised	concerns	about	its	‘authenticity’	and	‘authority’.	A	few	days	before	the	determination,	the	NNTT	received	a	letter	confirming	Adrian	Burragubba	as	an	authorised	representative	of	the	WJ	Family	Council.	However,	his	statements	were	still	dismissed	on	the	basis	that	they	failed	“in	terms	of	authority”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	The	NNTT	reasoned	that	since	his	submission	did	not	receive	any	support	from	the	other	applicants,	it	should	not	be	taken	into	consideration	as	evidence.		Consistent	with	their	submission	in	the	May	2013	determination,	the	State	Government	and	Adani	both	reflect	similar	views	and	sought	a	determination	that	would	impose	no	conditions	on	the	two	mining	leases	(Adani	Mining	v.	
Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).	Both	parties	contended	that	the	grant	of	mining	leases	in	the	area	was	unlikely	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	native	title	group’s	enjoyment	of	their	rights	and	interests.	However,	it	was	admitted	that	they	were	unaware	of	whether	the	claim	group	exercised	their	rights	and	interests	in	the	proposed	area.	In	response	to	the	listed	criterion	of	the	NTA,	the	State	Government	and	Adani	claimed	that	they	were	unaware	of	any	likely	effect	on	the	claim	group’s	way	of	life,	culture	and	traditions;	development	of	social,	cultural	and	economic	structures;	freedom	of	access	and	freedom	to	
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carry	out	rites	and	ceremonies;	or	effect	on	the	areas	or	sites	of	particular	significance	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015).			The	State	Government	attributed	the	failure	of	negotiations	to	the	division	between	the	applicants.	In	its	submission	to	the	NNTT,	it	argued,	“the	Native	Title	Party	[the	applicants]	and	Grantee	Party	were	close	to	authorising	an	Indigenous	Land	Use	Agreement	(ILUA)…	but	that	issues	arose	within	the	Native	Title	Party	at	the	time	of	authorisation	of	the	proposed	ILUA”	(Adani	
Mining	v.	Adrian	Burragubba	&	Others,	2015,	p.	38).	Consistent	with	the	views	expressed	in	the	May	2013	determination,	the	State	Government	and	Adani	highlighted	the	economic	significance	of	the	Carmichael	Project	for	local	communities,	the	State	of	Queensland	and	wider	Australia.		The	State	Government	and	Adani	both	claimed	that	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	was	in	the	public	interest.	The	State	Government	emphasised	the	importance	of	the	mining	sector	within	the	national	economy,	asserting	that,		“the	grant	of	exploration	permits	is	central	to	the	maintenance	of	a	healthy	and	feasible	mining	industry	in	Queensland…	[and]	the	mining	industry	plays	a	pivotal	role	in	maintaining	Australia’s	economic	strength”	(Adani	Mining	v.	Adrian	
Burragubba	&	Others,	2015,	p.	43).	In	the	absence	of	any	material	submitted	that	challenged	the	views	of	the	mine’s	proponents,	the	NNTT	delivered	another	ruling	in	favour	of	Adani	and	attached	no	conditions	to	its	mining	leases.				
Response	to	the	Media	
Following	the	April	2015	determination,	Patrick	Malone	revealed	to	the	media	that	the	applicants’	decision	not	to	make	a	submission	to	the	NNTT	was	because	it	could	compromise	the	pending	recognition	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	native	title	claim	(Branco,	2015a).	While	Patrick	Malone	remained	aligned	with	the	pro-mine	cohort	during	negotiations,	at	times	he	has	expressed	criticisms	of	the	native	title	system	and	the	Carmichael	Project	in	his	statements	to	the	media.	He	has	spoken	of	the	inherent	bias	in	the	future	act	process	and	contended	that	the	NNTT	is	unfairly	skewed	towards	the	interests	of	mining	companies	and	the	government.	Having	an	awareness	of	the	NNTT’s	tendency	to	rule	in	the	favour	of	the	proponents,	he	felt	his	people	
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were	unlikely	to	have	a	successful	outcome	in	the	determination	(Branco,	2015a).	He	contended,	“We’re	looking	at	an	end	game	here	and	the	end	game	is	to	make	sure	that	we	get	our	native	title	determination…	If	we'd	have	gone	into	this	thing	where	we're	going	to	lose	they	would	have	used	that	against	us	having	our	native	title	rights	recognised”	(Branco,	2015,	para.	10).	It	appears	that	the	applicants’	anticipation	of	an	unsuccessful	outcome	before	the	NNTT	has	triggered	concerns	that	it	could	stand	in	the	way	of	their	wider	interests.			Adani’s	response	in	the	media	following	the	NNTT’s	second	determination	demonstrated	its	reluctance	to	acknowledge	members	of	the	claim	group	who	were	opposed	to	the	Carmichael	Project.	The	company	remained	adamant	that	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	supported	the	mine	and	that	it	was	negotiating	with	those	‘authorised’	to	represent	the	group	(Branco,	2015;	Borschmann,	2015;	“Qld:	Traditional	owners,”	2015).	In	statements	to	the	media,	Adani	claimed	that	Adrian	Burragubba	was	unauthorised	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	claim	group	(“Qld:	Traditional	owners,”	2015;	Borschmann,	2015;	Branco,	2015;	Frost,	2015).	In	March	2015,	an	Adani	spokesperson	told	
ABC	News,	“Adani	continues	to	negotiate	with	the	W&J	authorised	[emphasis	added]	representatives…	Adani	does	not	believe	that	the	W&J	don’t	want	this	mine”	(Borschmann,	2015,	para.	20-21).	The	allegations	against	Adrian	Burragubba	occurred	when	the	NNTT	was	taking	submissions	and	continued	for	months	after	the	determination	was	handed	down	in	April	2015.		Adani’s	attempt	to	suppress	the	views	of	Adrian	Burragubba	through	challenging	his	authority	undermines	the	legitimacy	of	the	native	title	system.	While	he	had	been	formally	appointed	to	represent	the	views	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people,	Adani	continued	to	dismiss	his	authority	to	speak	on	their	behalf	and	chose	to	liaise	with	the	applicants	who	were	more	accommodating	of	its	project	(Burragubba	&	Johnson,	2015).	In	its	submission	to	the	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples,	the	WJ	Family	Council	alleged	that,	“[Adani’s]	actions	include	undermining	and	challenging	the	right	of	our	authorised	senior	spokesperson	[Adrian	Burragubba]	to	speak	and	be	consulted”	(Burragubba	&	Johnson,	2015,	p.	2).	The	submission	also	addressed	Adani’s	efforts	to	use	division	to	advance	their	interests:		
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the	company	attempted	to	use	a	divide-and-conquer	tactic	by	excluding	our	senior	authorised	spokesperson,	Adrian	Burragubba,	who	was	at	the	time	one	of	the	three	people	comprising	the	Applicant	on	the	native	title	claim,	from	meetings	at	which	Adani	Mining	attempted	to	secure	agreements	with	the	two	other	Applicant	group	members…	the	company	has	falsely	stated	that	it	was	“dealing	with	all	duly	authorised	representatives”	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	when	it	was	dealing	only	with	the	two	members	of	the	former	Applicant	group	who	did	not	represent	the	wishes	of	our	people.	(Burragubba	&	Johnson,	2015,	p.	18)	While	Adrian	Burragubba	had	expressed	views	that	stood	in	isolation	to	the	views	of	Patrick	Malone	and	Irene	White,	his	opposition	to	the	Carmichael	Project	was	shared	with	a	section	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community.	Patrick	Malone	responded	to	Adani’s	allegations	and	told	media	that	Adrian	Burragubba	“had	as	much	right	to	speak	as	himself	or	Ms	White”	(Branco,	2015,	para.	17).	Thus,	despite	the	divided	opinion	between	the	applicants	in	the	months	preceding	and	following	the	April	2015	determination,	this	statement	confirms	that	at	least	one	of	the	applicants	supported	Adrian	Burragubba	as	an	authorised	representative	and,	unlike	Adani,	did	not	dispute	his	authority	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	claim	group.			The	literature	revealed	that	mining	companies	and	governments	are	quick	to	identify	and	capitalise	on	any	disunity	or	division	within	native	title	groups	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2007;	Marsh,	2013).	Internal	conflict	will	often	be	exploited	to	benefit	vested	interests	and	where	division	has	been	identified,	weaker	agreement	outcomes	have	followed	for	Indigenous	groups	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2007).		In	the	days	following	the	NNTT’s	April	2015	determination,	Adani	made	statements	to	the	media	that	highlighted	the	division	it	had	identified	between	the	native	title	applicants	(Branco,	2015).	An	Adani	spokesperson	told	The	
Brisbane	Times,	“Adani	is	aware	of	at	least	one	instance	where	the	authorised	majority	of	the	W&J	applicant	instructed	that	the	NNTT	should	disregard	an	individual	statement	of	one	of	its	group”	(Branco,	2015,	para.	11).	Along	with	identifying	disunity,	Adani	made	public	statements	to	undermine	the	authority	of	the	applicant	who	was	least	supportive	of	its	project.	This	
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response	could	be	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	stifle	emerging	views	within	the	claim	group	that	could	delay	or	thwart	negotiations.			
Parliamentary	Oversight	
The	State	Government’s	response	to	the	two	determinations	of	the	NNTT	is	consistent	with	the	discourse	of	representatives	in	State	Parliament.	During	parliamentary	debates	in	2014	and	2015,	members	have	expressed	their	support	for	the	Carmichael	Project	and	stressed	the	importance	of	the	resources	sector	to	Queensland.		In	May	2014,	the	former	Premier	Campbell	Newman	declared,	“we	are	particularly	excited	to	see	the	Adani	Carmichael	project	get	going”	(Queensland	Parliament.	Record	of	Proceedings,	May	21,	2014,	p.	1662).	In	May	2015,	the	Minister	for	State	Development	and	Natural	Resources	and	Mines,	Anthony	Lynham,	stated,	“There	is	no	doubt	that	the	resources	sector	drives	the	Queensland	economy…	A	jobs	focused	government	is	a	government	that	is	pro	the	resources	sector…	We	are	working	with	Adani	and	have	demonstrated	our	support	for	the	project”	(Queensland	Parliament.	Record	of	Proceedings,	May	7,	2015,	p.	560).	This	statement,	reflective	of	the	State	Government’s	submissions	to	the	NNTT,	emphasises	the	prioritisation	of	mining	as	a	key	component	of	the	State’s	economy.		The	statements	of	ministers	to	the	media	reflect	the	State	Government’s	support	of	Adani.	In	March	2015,	Anthony	Lynham	described	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	as	a	‘vital’	project	for	Queensland	(“Adani,	GVK	win	Queensland,”	2015).	In	June	2015,	Queensland	Labor	Treasurer	Curtis	Pitt	told	Fairfax	
Media,	“we	welcome	Adani’s	significant	investment	proposal	in	Queensland	with	the	Carmichael	Coal	Project	and	enabling	infrastructure”	(Cox,	2015a,	para.	4).	The	Queensland	Premier	Annastacia	Palaszczuk	told	ABC	News	in	October	2015,	“my	Government	will	continue	to	work	with	the	company	[Adani]	about	how	we	can	deliver	the	projects	that	are	needed	here	in	this	state”	(Hatzakis,	2015,	para.	10).	The	response	of	the	State	Government	in	parliament	demonstrates	its	overwhelming	support	for	mining	developments.	This	view	is	consistent	with	the	widespread	perception	of	mining	exploration	as	an	integral	national	interest.		
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The	rights	and	interests	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	are	seldom	mentioned	in	parliamentary	debate.	Despite	discussion	of	the	Carmichael	Project	in	State	Parliament,	the	oversight	of	Indigenous	concerns	has	been	largely	absent	when	the	topic	is	raised.	In	May	2016,	Anthony	Lynham	boasted	the	‘positive	progress’	made	between	Adani	and	the	traditional	owners	with	the	settlement	of	an	ILUA,	declaring	that	this	was	a	significant	milestone	for	the	advancement	of	the	project	(Queensland	Parliament.	Record	of	Proceedings,	May	11,	2016,	p.	1670).	The	State	Parliament	has	made	reference	to	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	once	more,	again	to	praise	desirable	developments	in	negotiations.		The	interests	of	the	claim	group	have	been	discussed	briefly	in	Federal	Parliament	in	the	context	of	contentious	environmental	legislation.	In	response	to	the	Environment	Protection	and	Biodiversity	Conservation	Amendment	(Standing)	Bill,	introduced	in	August	2015,	Labor	Member	Melissa	Parke	acknowledged	that	the	impacts	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	were	of	concern	to	the	traditional	owners	in	the	region.	She	made	reference	to	Adrian	Burragubba	as	a	representative	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	cohort	opposed	to	the	mine,	and	highlighted	that	the	proposed	legislation	would	unfairly	restrict	the	group’s	ability	to	challenge	similar	developments	in	the	courts	(Parliament	of	Australia.	Record	of	Proceedings,	September	9,	2015,	p.	9595).		While	the	concerns	of	environmental	groups	have	been	debated	at	length	in	Federal	Parliament,	its	members	have	failed	to	acknowledge	the	interests	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people.	While	the	media	has	captured	the	views	of	various	representatives	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	community,	there	appears	to	be	little	parliamentary	oversight	to	consider	the	interests	of	this	group	during	the	phases	of	approval.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	have	a	significant	stake	in	the	outcome	of	this	process,	as	they	possess	rights	to	the	land.	Despite	this,	parliamentary	discussion	has	mainly	focussed	on	environmental	opponents	to	the	Carmichael	Project	and	ignored	the	concerns	of	Indigenous	rights-holders	that	also	stand	in	opposition	to	the	development.	As	Wellington	(2016)	contends,	“Indigenous	opposition	to	the	Carmichael	mine	has	been	largely	whited	out	of	the	story…	By	ignoring	them,	government	and	media	fail	to	acknowledge	the	Indigenous	rights-based	challenge	to	the	Carmichael	mine”	(para.	17-18).	In	the	process	of	granting	multiple	approvals	
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to	Adani,	almost	no	dialogue	entered	Federal	or	State	Parliament	in	relation	to	Indigenous	rights	and	interests.		Parliament	has	failed	to	give	recognition	to	the	anti-mine	cohort.	It	is	unclear	whether	this	is	due	to	the	government’s	vested	interest	in	coal	mining	and	the	investment	of	Adani	in	central	Queensland,	or	whether	members	of	parliament	believe	that	the	native	title	process	is	a	fair	and	just	system	that	produces	legitimate	results.			
A	Disputed	Agreement	
While	the	second	rejection	of	the	ILUA	in	October	2014	was	a	clear	and	unanimous	decision,	the	vote	for	Adani’s	third	settlement	deal	has	been	disputed.	The	WJ	Family	Council	convened	an	authorisation	meeting	in	March	2016	with	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	where	the	ILUA	was	voted	down	for	a	third	time	(WJ	Family	Council,	2016a).	However,	Adani	convened	a	meeting	with	the	claim	group	the	following	month	on	16	April	2016	where	the	attendees	voted	in	favour	of	the	agreement	(“Adani	mine,”	2016).	While	the	WJ	Family	Council	have	labelled	this	meeting	a	‘sham’	and	deemed	the	vote	unauthorised	and	illegitimate,	the	State	Government	has	openly	supported	the	outcome	of	the	Adani-convened	meeting.			Representatives	of	the	WJ	Family	Council	have	contended	that	many	claimants	present	at	the	March	2016	meeting	had	chosen	to	boycott	the	meeting	organised	by	Adani	the	following	month	(WJ	Family	Council,	2016c).	As	many	members	of	the	claim	group	did	not	attend	the	Adani-convened	meeting	in	April,	the	vote	to	endorse	the	settlement	deal	was	unrepresentative	of	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	as	a	whole	(WJ	Family	Council,	2016c).	It	has	been	alleged	that	over	half	the	voters	were	not	members	of	claim	group	(Robertson,	2017).	This	has	raised	issues	of	validation,	as	the	WJ	Family	Council	claimed	that	more	than	200	of	the	340	voters	were	not	direct	descendants	of	the	12	families	who	comprise	the	claim	group.	Adani	engineered	the	meeting	outcome	and	spent	over	half	a	million	dollars	to	‘rent-a-crowd’	(WJ	Family	Council,	2017).	WJ	Family	Council	representative	Murrawah	Johnson	expressed	in	a	statement	that	“Adani	has	bussed	in	large	numbers	of	people,	including	non-members	of	our	claim	group	who	have	no	
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connection	to	the	country…	Many	members	of	the	claim	group	who	last	met	in	March	refused	to	attend	Adani’s	meeting	today”	(WJ	Family	Council,	2016c,	para.	8).	Adani	rejected	these	allegations	and	maintained	that	the	meeting	was	consistent	with	the	required	statutory	process	(“Adani	mine,”	2016).		The	ILUA	authorised	in	April	2016	included	an	upfront	payment	of	$550,000	to	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	and	an	Indigenous	Participation	Plan	that	would	distribute	approximately	$5,000	annually	to	each	person	living	in	the	region	(Wellington,	2016).	The	anti-mine	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	faction	have	claimed	that	the	ILUA	endorsed	in	April	2016	was	a	weaker	deal	than	the	previous	terms	of	agreement	on	offer.	The	windfall	amount	of	half	a	million	was	considerably	less	than	the	figure	included	in	the	settlement	deal	offered	in	2014,	alleged	to	be	$1.5	million	(McKenna,	2015a;	Robertson,	2017).	If	these	statements	are	accurate,	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	claimants	willing	to	accommodate	the	mine	have	been	unable	to	negotiate	a	satisfactory	agreement	and	have	settled	for	a	weaker	deal	under	pressure	from	Adani.	However,	if	indeed	the	majority	of	the	attendees	at	the	April	2016	meeting	were	not	part	of	the	claim	group	as	it	has	been	alleged,	then	Adani	has	engineered	a	partial	agreement.	This	was	the	second	time	Adani	has	acted	to	force	an	outcome.	An	unsuccessful	attempt	was	made	at	the	end	of	2012	when	it	convened	a	meeting	in	concert	with	the	WJ	Corporation,	sidelining	the	registered	applicants.			Despite	the	WJ	Family	Council’s	condemnation	of	the	authorisation	meeting	in	April,	the	Australian	Government	has	left	the	legitimacy	of	the	standing	ILUA	unquestioned.	Instead,	the	Federal	and	State	Government	have	welcomed	the	decision	and	remained	silent	on	the	contentiousness	of	the	matter.			
The	McGlade	decision:	A	new	hope	or	more	uncertainty?	
The	Commonwealth	has	scrambled	to	amend	the	NTA	in	response	to	a	recent	Federal	Court	determination	that	invalidated	countless	ILUAs	(Borrello,	2017;	Connors,	2017;	McKenna,	2017;	Sferruzzi,	2017).	In	February	2016,	a	landmark	Western	Australian	court	action	known	as	the	McGlade	decision	set	a	new	precedent	for	the	authorisation	of	ILUAs.	Prior	to	the	ruling,	the	requirements	to	authorise	ILUAs	had	been	based	on	the	2010	Bygrave	
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decision	whereby	authorisation	was	considered	valid	if	a	clear	majority	of	the	native	title	claimants	voted	for	the	agreement.	However,	the	McGlade	case	has	nullified	these	requirements	and	created	uncertainty	for	126	ILUAs	across	the	nation	(McKenna,	2017;	Mesner,	2017;	Sferruzzi,	2017).		
McGlade	affects	native	title	groups	that	have	a	registered	claim	but	have	not	received	a	determination	in	the	Federal	Court.	This	includes	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	and	their	contentious	ILUA	with	Adani	(McKenna,	2017).	The	McGlade	decision	requires	a	unanimous	vote	to	authorise	ILUAs.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	people	who	attended	the	authorisation	meeting	in	April	2016	voted	294-1.	The	votes	of	the	native	title	applicants	were	also	split,	as	five	of	the	12	applicants	voted	against	the	ILUA	(Mesner,	2017;	Robertson,	2017;	Rooney,	2017;	Sferruzzi,	2017).	The	vote	at	the	meeting	was	not	unanimous	and	the	ILUA	has	become	invalidated	as	a	result	of	McGlade.		In	response	to	McGlade,	the	Federal	Government	has	sought	to	amend	the	NTA	in	order	to	revalidate	the	affected	ILUAs	(McKenna,	2017a;	Sferruzzi,	2017).	The	government	has	defended	the	move	to	amend	the	Act	on	the	grounds	that	
McGlade	could	freeze	the	operation	of	some	developments	and	jeopardise	the	benefits	delivered	to	Indigenous	groups	(McHugh,	2017).	However,	representatives	of	the	WJ	Family	Council	and	a	number	of	Australian	Greens	Members	and	Senators	have	claimed	that	the	government	has	‘fast-tracked’	amendments	to	remediate	the	effects	on	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	(Borello,	2017;	Connors,	2017;	“Senate	inquiry,”	2017;	WJ	Family	Council,	2017).		As	the	implications	of	McGlade	presents	a	further	obstacle	to	the	Carmichael	Project,	the	government	has	attempted	to	rush	the	amendments	to	secure	certainty	for	Adani	and	the	coal	lobby.	It	has	also	been	alleged	that	the	motion	to	legislate	the	amendments	has	proceeded	without	proper	Indigenous	consultation.	The	Attorney	General,	George	Brandis,	has	faced	criticisms	for	his	attempt	to	avoid	consultation	with	stakeholders	and	pass	the	amendments	through	the	Senate	in	one	day	(“Miners	support,”	2017;	“Senate	inquiry,”	2017).		The	response	of	the	Federal	Government	in	the	aftermath	of	the	McGlade	decision	can	be	interpreted	through	the	lens	of	critical	race	theory	(CRT).	A	major	concept	in	CRT	is	that	rights	afforded	to	blacks	will	always	be	diminished	when	they	conflict	with	white	interests.	Whites	also	seek	to	
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maintain	dominance	and	power	over	resources.	Thus,	in	the	wake	of	McGlade,	proponents	of	the	amendments	to	the	NTA	reflect	the	view	that	the	rights	afforded	to	blacks	will	always	be	modified	or	reversed	if	they	are	perceived	to	undermine	the	interests	of	whites.	As	the	Australian	Government	has	a	vested	interest	in	the	energy	and	mining	sector,	it	has	prioritised	the	development	of	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	and	ignored	Indigenous	rights	and	interests.	The	proposed	amendments	to	the	Act	demonstrate	the	efforts	of	government	to	negate	the	requirements	of	native	title	and	further	undermine	the	rights	of	Indigenous	opponents	to	the	Carmichael	Project.			
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Conclusion	
The	findings	of	this	thesis	confirm	a	number	of	common	observations	in	the	literature.	The	decision-making	of	state	institutions	and	government	in	relation	to	mining	development	projects	commonly	bends	in	favour	of	mining	interests	over	Indigenous	interests	(Howlett,	2010;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Ritter,	2009).	The	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT)	as	a	state	institution	that	deals	with	developments	on	areas	of	native	title	interprets	the	Native	Title	Act	(NTA)	to	benefit	mining	interests	and	rarely	rejects	proposals	(Howlett,	2010;	Corbett		&	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).	While	the	Australian	Government	has	accommodated	mining	interests,	it	has	been	unwilling	to	support	the	interests	of	native	title	groups	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	Ritter,	2009;	Scambary,	2013).	Several	studies	concluded	that	the	NTA	offers	a	weak	foothold	for	Indigenous	groups	during	the	approval	process.	The	NTA	cannot	be	solely	relied	upon	to	uphold	Indigenous	interests	and	enable	traditional	owners	to	negotiate	a	desirable	agreement	with	resource	companies	or	otherwise	refuse	to	accept	developments	on	their	land	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006,	2008;	Short,	2007).	In	both	cases	where	Adani	took	the	matter	to	the	NNTT	for	determination,	it	ruled	in	favour	of	the	mining	leases	and	dismissed	the	applicants’	request	for	conditions	to	be	attached	to	the	first	mining	lease.	The	conduct	of	the	NNTT	examined	in	this	case	study	is	consistent	with	the	literature,	which	demonstrates	the	State’s	reluctance	to	reject	or	attach	any	conditions	to	mining	developments	grants.	Adrian	Burragubba	highlights	the	resource-focus	of	state	institutions	like	the	NNTT	that	corrupt	the	impartiality	of	the	native	title	system.	He	argues,	“There’s	an	inherent	bias	in	the	system	where	companies	know	if	they	get	a	“no”	they	can	go	to	the	Tribunal	and	are	virtually	guaranteed	to	get	their	mining	lease”	(Milman,	2015a,	para.	10).	There	is	strong	evidence	to	indicate	that	Adani	remained	confident	that	it	had	the	unqualified	support	of	the	State	Government	during	the	phases	of	approval.	In	Patrick	Malone’s	affidavit	to	the	NNTT,	he	recalled	a	conversation	with	a	representative	of	Adani:	[who]	said	words	to	the	effect	that	the	grantee	party	was	‘flavour	of	the	week’	with	the	Government	party	which	wanted	the	project	to	go	ahead,	and	that	the	grantee	party	did	not	need	the	native	title	group	
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because	the	grantee	party	could	get	all	the	approvals	they	need	from	the	State.	(Adani	Mining	v.	Jessie	Diver	&	Others,	2013,	p.	51)	This	is	consistent	with	the	findings	in	the	literature	that	purport	the	State	will	prioritise	mining	exploration	above	Indigenous	interests.	When	matters	proceed	to	the	State	for	determination,	mining	companies	can	rest	assured	that	they	will	receive	a	positive	outcome	in	favour	of	their	interests	(Howlett,	2010;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006).		While	the	literature	acknowledges	that	divided	opinion	in	Indigenous	communities	often	results	during	the	negotiation	process	(Altman,	2009;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006,	2008;	Scambary,	2013),	there	are	no	studies	that	examine	community	division	in	depth.	This	thesis	confirms	the	general	view	that	the	division	of	communities	complicates	the	process,	delays	negotiations	and	can	influence	the	outcome	of	agreements.	However,	this	study	provides	greater	insights	into	how	the	process	can	intensify	and	perpetuate	division.	The	emergence	of	two	distinct	factions	within	the	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	claim	group	reveals	the	limitations	of	the	native	title	system	in	terms	of	accommodating	the	interests	of	the	anti-mine	faction.	This	group	has	experienced	greater	barriers	to	achieving	recognition	of	their	interests.	While	Adani	has	actively	attempted	to	silence	the	representatives	of	this	cohort	by	contesting	their	authority,	the	government	has	failed	to	provide	sufficient	oversight	and	acknowledge	their	concerns	during	parliamentary	debate.		These	challenges	have	been	compounded	by	the	inadequacies	of	the	rights	afforded	to	native	title	claimants	under	the	NTA.	The	current	legislation	does	little	to	support	those	overtly	opposed	to	developments	on	their	land,	as	it	lacks	the	option	to	veto	future	acts.	These	findings	highlighting	the	weaknesses	of	the	NTA,	in	terms	of	providing	a	platform	to	assert	Indigenous	rights	and	interests,	remain	consistent	with	criticisms	in	the	literature	that	expose	similar	inadequacies	(O’Faircheallaigh,	2006,	2008;	Short,	2007).	Indigenous	land	rights	in	Australia	have	continued	to	operate	within	a	system	that	prioritises	resource	interests.	This	creates	an	impossible	environment	for	native	title	claimants	to	have	their	interests	recognised	and	to	influence	decision-makers	when	seeking	to	prevent	the	State’s	imposition	of	large	mining	developments	on	their	land.		
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In	addition	to	the	insights	on	division,	this	thesis	offers	a	recent	case	study	to	update	the	existing	body	of	literature.	The	studies	that	have	previously	examined	the	convergence	of	native	title,	the	state	and	mining	developments	have	focused	on	agreements	negotiated	and	signed	over	10	years	ago	(Altman,	2009;	Corbett	&	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006;	O’Faircheallaigh,	2006,	2008;	Scambary,	2013).	This	thesis	provides	an	updated	case	study,	confirming	and	adding	insights	to	the	existing	body	of	literature.				
Added	Insights:	Multiple	Modes	of	Analysis	
While	this	study	confirms	the	literature	in	the	area	of	native	title	and	resource	developments,	it	adds	insights	through	its	application	of	multiple	modes	of	analysis.	The	liberal	culturalist	theories	of	Will	Kymlicka	and	Allen	Buchanan	provide	strong	justifications	for	collective	rights	in	liberal	democracies.	However,	they	fail	to	address	the	underlying	discriminative	nature	of	these	societies	that	set	such	ideals	on	a	path	to	inadequacy.	Critical	race	theory	(CRT)	reasons	that	the	failure	of	collective	rights	to	achieve	equality	for	Indigenous	groups	is	the	embedded	racial	prejudice	that	continues	to	dominate	the	status	quo	in	these	societies	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Hutchinson,	2004;	Gillborn,	2005).		While	a	liberal	culturalist	perspective	identifies	the	inherent	requirement	for	collective	rights	to	remediate	inequality,	CRT	provides	an	explanation	for	the	failure	of	these	rights	to	reach	these	ideals.	CRT	exposes	the	innate	racial	imbalance	that	perseveres	in	liberal-democratic	societies,	despite	the	adoption	of	collective	rights	(Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012;	Hutchinson,	2004;	Gillborn,	2005).	Liberal	culturalism	conceptualises	a	set	of	ideals	where	the	recognition	of	collective	rights	restores	a	sense	of	racial	equilibrium.	CRT	unmasks	why	these	ideals	fail	to	actualize.		Native	title	represents	an	idealised	system,	whereby	historical	wrongdoings	are	rectified	through	the	establishment	of	collective	land	rights	for	Indigenous	groups.	While	it	has	conferred	benefits	to	a	number	of	Indigenous	groups,	it	is	also	a	flawed	system.	At	every	stage,	the	rights	allocated	under	the	NTA	can	be	overridden	by	the	State.	CRT	argues	that	while	state	institutions	and	government	may	support	the	adoption	of	collective	rights	for	Indigenous	
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people,	they	ensure	that	these	rights	do	not	supersede	the	power	of	white	institutions	(Hutchinson,	2004;	Delgado	&	Stefancic,	2012).	Australia	represents	a	significant	illustration	of	CRT	theory	given	the	power	wielded	by	the	resource	industry,	as	outlined	in	Chapter	Two.	In	the	Australian	context,	economic	interests	have	led	to	the	reversal	of	the	rights	afforded	to	Indigenous	groups.	While	traditional	owners	have	gained	collective	rights	to	protect	their	ancestral	lands,	rights	under	the	NTA	do	not	stand	in	the	way	of	the	State	and	government’s	power	to	acquire	that	land.	The	Australian	Government	has	been	willing	to	grant	Indigenous	rights	to	land.	However,	it	has	not	been	willing	to	sacrifice	its	power	to	determine	how	that	land	is	used.			While	the	power	and	influence	of	energy	and	mining	companies	in	Australia’s	political	sphere	are	made	explicit	in	this	study,	its	findings	reinforce	the	doctrine	of	CRT.	State	institutions	and	government	have	acted	to	nullify	‘black’	rights	and	interests	in	order	to	advance	their	own	‘white’	interests,	which	seek	to	expand	and	invest	in	the	resource	sector.	While	some	studies	have	reasoned	that	the	limitations	of	native	title	are	linked	to	entrenched	colonial	structures	(Altman,	2009;	Short,	2007),	this	study	is	the	first	to	examine	Indigenous	land	rights	through	the	lens	of	CRT.	There	remains	an	embedded	bias	towards	Indigenous	groups	that	attempt	to	defend	their	land	when	it	faces	the	encroachment	of	resource	interests.	The	State’s	interpretation	of	the	NTA	and	the	response	of	government	to	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	illustrate	the	deficiencies	of	a	system	underpinned	by	institutionalised	racism	that	continues	to	constrain	and	limit	the	rights	and	interests	of	Indigenous	Australians.					
Postscript			As	of	the	time	of	writing,	the	final	approval	for	the	Carmichael	Coal	Mine	has	been	suspended	indefinitely	due	to	uncertainty	over	a	royalties	deal	with	the	Queensland	Government.	The	Wangan	and	Jagalingou	Family	Council	continue	to	challenge	the	development	in	the	courts.							
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